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 Abstract 
The relationship between infrastructures and productivity has been the subject of an ongoing 
debate during the last two decades. The available empirical evidence is inconclusive and its 
interpretation is complicated by econometric problems that have not been fully solved. This paper 
surveys the relevant literature, focusing on studies that estimate aggregate production functions or 
growth regressions, and extracts some tentative conclusions. On the whole, my reading of the 
evidence is that there are sufficient indications that public infrastructure investment contributes 
significantly to productivity growth, at least for countries where a saturation point has not been 
reached. The returns to such investment are probably quite high in early stages, when 
infrastructures are scarce and basic networks have not been completed, but fall sharply thereafter. 
Hence, appropriate infrastructure provision is probably a key input for development policy, even if 
it does not hold the key to rapid productivity growth in advanced countries where transportation 
and communications needs are already adequately served.  
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 1. Introduction 
An important part of public investment expenditure finances the construction and maintenance of 
infrastructures (such as transport, energy and water supply networks) that provide productive 
services to the private sector of the economy as well as direct consumption benefits. This paper 
surveys the literature that has tried to measure the impact of such expenditure on productivity 
growth through the estimation of aggregate (national or regional) production functions in which 
public capital or infrastructures enter as an input, or through cross-country growth regressions. 
Although research in this area has been quite active for two decades, we are still far from having 
reached a consensus on the contribution of infrastructure investment to economic growth. A good 
many studies have addressed the issue using different econometric specifications and various 
regional and national samples with mixed results. Some of them conclude that the rate of return on 
infrastructure capital is very high and that public investment is an important determinant of the 
rate of growth of national or regional income. Other studies, however, obtain much more 
pessimistic results and conclude that the contribution of public capital to aggregate output is very 
small or non-existent -- or at least cannot be detected using the traditional framework of an 
aggregate production function. Since this discrepancy can, to a considerable extent, be traced back 
to the use of different empirical specifications in the existing studies, it will be necessary to start by 
briefly discussing some econometric issues. This will be done in Section 2, trying to keep the 
technicalities to a minimum. Sections 3-5 of the paper review some of the most interesting studies 
on the subject, starting with Aschauer's controversial (1989a) paper and the reactions to it. I will 
concentrate on a series of studies that have tried to quantify the direct impact of infrastructure 
investment on productivity through the estimation of aggregate production functions and 
convergence equations. I will not deal with the relationship between private and public investment 
or discuss the numerous studies that have approached the subject through the estimation of cost or 
profit functions. Section 6 closes the paper with a brief summary and some reflections on the 
implications of the existing empirical evidence. 1 
 
                                                           
1 See Gramlich (1994) and Draper and Herce (1994) for two broad reviews of the literature on infrastructure 
investment which cover many issues I do not address and provide useful references. Munnell (1992) provides 
a non-technical introduction to many of the questions discussed in this paper. Kessides (1993), Hurst (1994), 
Romp and de Haan (2007) and Straub (2008) also survey the literature on infrastructure and productivity from 
different perspectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 2. Empirical specifications and some econometric issues 
Most econometric studies of the determinants of national or regional productivity start out from the 
assumption that there exists a stable relationship between aggregate output on the one hand and 
the stocks of productive factors (labor and different types of capital) and the level of technical 
efficiency on the other. This relationship is described by an aggregate production function that is 
typically assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas type: 
  (1) Yit = Ait Kit
?kPit?pLit?l . 
In this expression Yit denotes the aggregate output of region or country i at time t, Lit is the level of 
employment, Kit the stock of private physical capital, Pit the stock of public capital or productive 
infrastructures and Ait an index of technical efficiency or total factor productivity (TFP) which 
summarizes the current state of the technology and captures omitted factors such as geographical 
location, climate and endowments of natural resources. The coefficients ?i (with i = k, p, l) measure 
the elasticity of output with respect to the stocks of the different factors. An increase of 1% in the 
stock of public capital, for example, would increase output by ?p%, holding constant the stocks of 
the other factors and the level of technical efficiency.  
Given time series data on output and factor stocks in one or more countries or regions, we can use 
standard statistical techniques to determine the values of the coefficients ?k, ?l and ?p that best 
explain the observed behavior of output in terms of the evolution of factor inputs. To this end, it is 
convenient to take logarithms of (1) in order to obtain a linear relationship between the variables of 
interest. Using lower-case letters to denote logarithms and adding a random disturbance to the 
equation, we have: 
  (2) yit = ait + ?kkit + ?ppit + ?llit + ?it. 
A second transformation of this expression is also useful. For each variable x, let ?xit = xit+1 - xit be 
its first difference. If we lead equation (2) by one period and subtract from it equation (2) itself, we 
obtain an expression that relates the rate of growth of output in each period (?yit) with the rates of 
accumulation of the different productive factors and the rate of technological progress (?ait):2 
  (3) ?yit = ?ait + ?k ?kit + ?p ?pit + ?l ?lit + ??it. 
Equation (2) is sometimes called a specification in levels of the production function, while equation 
(3) is a specification in (first) differences.  
                                                           
2 Notice that the variables in equation (2) are in logarithms. The change in the logarithm of a variable from one 
period to the next is approximately equal to the percentage increase in the variable. 
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One of the problems that arise in the estimation of any of these specifications is that ait (the level of 
technical efficiency) and ?ait (the rate of technical progress) are not directly observable. To estimate 
the desired relation, therefore, it is necessary to make additional assumptions about the behavior of 
these terms. To illustrate some of the specifications commonly used in the literature, let us assume 
that the rate of technical progress (g) is constant over time and common to all the countries in the 
sample. In this case we have ait = aio + gt and the specification in levels would be of the form 
  (2') yit = aio + gt + ?kkit + ?ppit + ?llit + ?it, 
where the term aio captures differences across countries in the level of technical efficiency (which 
are assumed to remain constant over time) and other unobservable factors that may affect output. 
The existence of such specific effects raises important estimation issues. Although some authors have 
argued that it may be reasonable to assume a common value of aio because most technical 
knowledge is in principle accessible everywhere, casual observation suggests that levels of 
technological development differ widely across countries and possibly regions, and that other 
unobserved factors may be important. If this is so, failure to control for such differences (or for any 
other relevant variables) will bias the estimates of the remaining parameters whenever the 
regressors in the equation are correlated with the omitted variables. In other words, we can only 
legitimately subsume technological differences across countries in the error term if they are 
uncorrelated with factor stocks. This seems unlikely, however, as the level of total factor 
productivity is one of the key determinants of the rate of return on investment. The problem also 
arises, and may be even more important, in the case of public capital, as anything that increases 
income is likely to increase the demand for infrastructures. Hence, estimates of equation (2') that do 
not control for specific effects may be subject to a sort of endogeneity bias reflecting reverse causation 
from income to public capital. I will return to this issue in greater detail below. 
The standard solution for this problem is to turn to panel data techniques in order to control for 
unobserved national or regional effects. One possibility is to estimate a fixed effects model. This 
involves introducing dummy variables (or some equivalent device) in order to estimate a different 
regression constant for each country or region. A second possibility is to estimate a random effects 
model. In this case, the aio's are treated as different realizations of a stochastic variable, rather than 
as parameters to be estimated. The regression would now yield a single constant term (ao) that 
would capture the average value of aio, and differences in technical efficiency across countries 
would be captured by a perturbation term which would include a national component.3  
                                                           
3 That is, the error term would now be of the form ?it = ?it + ?i, where ?i is a random variable with zero mean. 
This formulation implicitly assumes that the sample of countries or regions constitutes a random draw from a 
larger population, an assumption which is probably not very reasonable in the present context. For a more 
detailed discussion of both types of specific effects models, see for example Kmenta (1986, pp. 525 and ff.). 
Holtz-Eakin (1994) also discusses both types of models and their use in the public capital literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Each of these forms to control for the possible existence of specific effects has its own advantages 
and disadvantages. The main shortcoming of the fixed effects model is that it ignores most of the 
information contained in the cross-section variation of the data. When we employ this specification 
we are essentially estimating the production function with the variables measured in deviations 
from their average values for each country (taken over the entire sample period). As a result, the 
parameters are identified by the variation over time of output and its determinants in the different 
countries. The random effects model, on the other hand, does make use of the cross-sectional 
variation in the data but it has the important disadvantage that if the specific effects are correlated 
with the regressors, as seems quite likely, the estimation will yield unreliable results (the coefficient 
estimates will be inconsistent). In principle, it is possible to determine which specification is better 
by making use of the so-called Hausman test, which is basically a test of the hypothesis that the 
specific effects and the regressors are uncorrelated. 
The two types of techniques we have just summarized can also be applied to control for period-
specific effects (introducing a dummy variable for each year of the sample or a temporal component 
in the error term). These period-specific effects may be used to capture the impact of technical 
progress or the effect of cyclical shocks if both processes follow a similar pattern in the entire 
sample. Both types of effects can also be used in combination with a specification in first 
differences. Their interpretation, however, will be different in each case. If we take first differences 
of equation (2'), for example, we see that the (time-independent) country specific effect disappears. 
Hence, the specification in first differences (3) implicitly allows for cross-country (but time-
independent) differences in levels of technical efficiency. When we include national dummies in this 
equation, their coefficients will capture permanent differences across countries or regions in rates of 
technical progress. 
To complete the specification, many studies add other variables to the estimated equations. A 
common practice is to include the rate of unemployment or some indicator of capacity utilization to 
control for cyclical shocks, or to use these variables to correct the capital stock series prior to 
estimation. Some studies disaggregate the private or public capital stocks into various components 
(equipment and structures, or roads and other infrastructures), or add other variables to the list of 
productive factors (e.g. some indicator of the stock of human capital).  
As we will see, different specifications of the same production function often yield very different 
results. To determine which results are more reasonable we have at least two sets of criteria. The 
first one has to do with the statistical "goodness" of the estimation. In each case, we should check 
the goodness of fit of the model, measured by the R2 of the regression, the precision of the 
coefficient estimates, measured by their standard error or the corresponding t statistic, and the 
results of the relevant specification tests. A second, common sense, criterion would be to require 
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a) a specification sufficiently flexible so as to capture differences across countries and periods 
which, in all likelihood, should be there and 
b) sensible estimates of all the parameters of the model, and not only of the coefficient of public 
capital. 
Economic theory provides some help in this respect. Under the assumptions of perfect competition 
and constant returns to scale, the coefficients of private capital and labor in the production function 
should be equal to the shares of these factors in national income. Hence, the coefficient of private 
capital (or the sum of the coefficients of private and public capital, given that the second factor is a 
free input and private capital is entitled to the surplus) should be between 0.30 and 0.40, and the 
coefficient of labor (or the sum of the coefficients of labor and human capital, since the return to the 
second factor is a component of wages), should be between 0.60 and 0.70. Although none of the 
assumptions which yield this prediction holds in a strict sense in real economies, estimates of input 
coefficients that are very far from these benchmark values should be regarded as suspect and may 
indicate some problem with the specification. 
 
 Convergence equations 
Many empirical studies of the determinants of growth have proceeded by estimating a convergence 
equation of the type popularized by Barro (1991a)4, that is, a regression of the form 
  (4) ?qit  = Xit?  -  ?qit 
where ?qit is the growth rate of output per worker or per capita in country i over the period that 
starts at time t, qit the logarithm of the initial level of the same variable and Xit a vector of other 
relevant variables. The initial level of income is included in the regression to capture a convergence 
effect that will favor poorer economies under the standard assumption of decreasing returns to 
scale in capital.  
Equation (4) provides a flexible framework that has been used in the literature to investigate the 
impact on growth of a host of variables, including public investment and many other fiscal 
indicators. One important advantage of this approach is that, unlike production functions, 
convergence equations can be estimated without data on factor stocks, which are often hard to 
come by. In early studies in this literature, the empirical specification was frequently ad hoc and 
only loosely tied with the theory. In more recent years, however, researchers have increasingly 
focused on the estimation of "structural" convergence equations derived explicitly from formal 
models.  
                                                           
4 Similar formulations had already been used by Kormendi and McGuire (1985), Grier and Tullock (1989) and 
Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) among others. 
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One of the most popular specifications in the literature is the one derived by Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (MRW 1992) from an extended neoclassical model à la Solow (1956) with exogenous technical 
progress. Working with a log-linear approximation to the model around its steady state, MRW 
derive an equation linking the growth rate of output per worker over a given period (?qit) with the 
logarithm of the initial value of the same variable (qit), the rate of growth of the labor force (nit) and 
the shares in GDP of various types of investment measured over the same period. If we start from a 
constant-returns production function that includes both private and public capital as inputs (as in 
equation (1) above) and assume a common rate of depreciation for both types of capital, the 
equation takes the following form:5 
  (5) ?qit = g + ?(aio + gt) + ? ? k1?? k ?? p ln
skit
? + g + nit + ?
? p
1?? k ?? p ln
spit
? + g + nit ? ?qit  
where  
  (6) ? = (1-?) (?+g+n),  
g is the rate of technical progress (which is assumed to be constant over time and across countries), 
? the depreciation rate, ?i the coefficient of capital of type i in the aggregate production function, t 
the time elapsed since the beginning of the sample period, aio the logarithm of the index of technical 
efficiency or TFP at time zero, si the share of investment in type i capital in GDP and ni the rate of 
growth of the labor force.6 
It is important to understand that the estimation of equation (5) does not imply that we are literally 
accepting the assumptions of the underlying Solow-type model (i.e. we do not need to assume that 
investment rates are necessarily exogenous for estimation purposes or constant over time). What 
we are doing is simply assigning to some of the parameters of the Solow model (in particular, to sk, 
sp and n) the observed average values of their empirical counterparts during a given period. During 
this period, the economy will behave approximately as if it were approaching the steady state of the 
Solow model that corresponds to the contemporaneous parameter values. In the next period, of 
course, we are likely to observe different values of the investment and population growth rates and 
therefore, a different steady state, but this poses no real difficulty. In essence, all we are doing is 
constructing an approximation to the production function that allows us to recover its parameters 
                                                           
5 Barro and Sala i Martin (1990, 1992) derive a similar expression from a variant of the optimal growth model 
of Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) with exogenous technical progress. The resulting equation is similar to (5) 
except that the investment rate (which is now endogenous) is replaced by the rate of time discount among the 
determinants of the steady state. The convergence coefficient, ?, is now a more complicated function of the 
parameters of the model, but it still depends on the degree of decreasing returns to capital and on the rates of 
population growth, depreciation and technical progress. 
6 In principle, ?  should vary across countries reflecting differences in rates of population growth (ni). Most 
studies, however, impose a common value of this parameter for all countries. In this case, the n that enters 
equation (6) should be interpreted as the average value of this variable in the entire sample. 
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using data on investment flows rather than factor stocks. This is very convenient because such data 
are widely available and can be expected to be both more reliable and more comparable over time 
and across countries than most existing estimates of factor stocks.  
The empirical implementation of equations (4) or (5) does not, in principle, raise special problems. 
Given data on output, employment and private and public investment flows for a sample of 
countries or regions, we can use (5) to recover estimates of the rate of convergence and the 
parameters of the production function. The convergence equation can be estimated using either 
cross-section or pooled data. Most of the earlier convergence studies took the first route, averaging 
the variables over the entire sample period and working with a single observation for each country 
or region. The second possibility, which has become increasingly popular over time, involves 
averaging over shorter subperiods in order to obtain several observations per country.   
In either case, one difficulty that immediately becomes apparent is that three of the variables on the 
right-hand side of the equation (g, ?  and aio) are not directly observable. In the first two cases, the 
problem is probably not very important. Although these coefficients can be estimated inside the 
equation (and this has been done occasionally), the usual procedure in the literature is to impose 
"reasonable" values of these parameters prior to estimation. The standard assumption is that g = 
0.02 and ? = 0.03, but researchers report that estimation results are not very sensitive to changes in 
these values. As we have already seen, the possibility that initial levels of technical efficiency (aio) 
may differ across countries does raise a more difficult problem. Our earlier discussion about the 
estimation of models with specific effects applies also to convergence equations, as it is unlikely 
that initial TFP is uncorrelated with other regressors, and in particular with income per capita. 
 
 Reverse causation 
As we have already seen, a standard concern when we are trying to estimate the impact of 
infrastructures on productivity is that reverse causation from income to public investment may 
generate an upward bias in the estimated coefficient of infrastructures in the production function. 
The source of the reverse causation bias is that the feedback effects of income on infrastructure can 
generate a correlation between the latter variable and the disturbance of the production function, 
thereby violating the conditions that are necessary for the consistency of ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimators.   
To illustrate the nature of the problem, suppose we are trying to estimate a production function 
  (7) yi = ?pi + ?ki + ?i 
where y is log output, p and k the (logs of the) stocks of infrastructures and other capital and and ?i 
a random disturbance. Suppose also that the supply of infrastructures is an increasing function of y  
given by 
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  (8) pi = byi + cxi + ?i 
where x is some other relevant variable and ?i a disturbance term. In this setup, a positive shock to 
income in equation (7) (a positive value of ?i) will increase (yi and hence) pi through equation (8). As 
a result, the regressor pi will be correlated with the disturbance of the production function and the 
estimate of its coefficient obtained by OLS will be biased.  
To calculate the bias, let us ignore the additional regressors, k and x. (It can be shown that their 
introduction does not qualitatively alter the results I will present shortly). Solving (7) and (8) 
simultaneously, we can write yi and pi as functions of the disturbance terms, ?i and ?i. Substituting 
(8) into (7) (after setting ?  = c = 0), we have 
 yi = ?(byi + vi ) + ?i  ?  (1??b)yi = ?vi + ?i  ?  (9) yi = ?vi + ?i1??b  
and inserting (9) into (8) 
 (10) pi = byi + vi = b
?vi + ?i
1??b + vi =
?bvi + b?i + (1??b)vi
1??b =
b?i + vi
1??b  
Let us now see what happens when we try to estimate equation (7) by OLS. Under our 
assumptions, the (expected value of the) OLS estimator of ?  will be given by: 
 (11) ?ˆ = Epy
Ep2
 
Using (9) and (10) we have 
 (12) Epy = E
b? + v
1??b
?v + ?
1??b =
E(b? + v)(?v + ?)
(1??b)2 =
E(?b?v + b? 2 +?v2 + v?)
(1??b)2 =
bE? 2 +?Ev2
(1??b)2  
and  
 (13) Ep2 = E
b? + v
1??b
?
??
?
??
2
=
E(b? + v)2
(1??b)2 =
E(b2? 2 + 2b?v + v2 )
(1??b)2 =
b2E? 2 + Ev2
(1??b)2  
Hence, the OLS estimator of ? will be given by 
 (14) ?ˆ = Epy
Ep2
=
bE? 2 +?Ev2
b2E? 2 + Ev2 = ?
Ev2
b2E? 2 + Ev2 + b
E? 2
b2E? 2 + Ev2 = ?
Ev2
b2E? 2 + Ev2 +
1
b
?
??
?
??
b2E? 2
b2E? 2 + Ev2  
which shows that its expected value will be a weighted average of the true value of the parameter, 
?, and of the inverse of the slope of the feedback relationship from income to the stock of 
infrastructures, 1/b. Rearranging terms, we can also write this expression in the form 
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 (15) ?ˆ = ? + 1
b
?????
?
??
b2E? 2
b2E? 2 + Ev2  
where we see that the sign of the bias depends on the difference between ? and 1/b (and is not 
necessarily positive when b > 0 as is sometimes asserted). 
Hence, the existence of a feedback relationship between income and the stock of infrastructures will 
bias our results if we try to estimate the production function by OLS. In practice, however, things 
are not necessarily quite as bad as the previous discussion may suggest because public capital 
stocks are likely to respond to income shocks only with a considerable lag due to the long gestation 
period of infrastructure projects. Thus, we should probably replace equation (8) by something like 
the following system 
  (16) Pit = (1? ? )Pit + IPit  
  (17) IPit = f (yit?1, yit?2 ...)  
where IPit is infrastructure investment in period t. Notice that with this specification the problem 
disappears. Now, a positive shock to income in (8) will increase future investment but will not 
affect the current stock of public capital, implying that pit can still be uncorrelated with the 
contemporaneous disturbance in equation (8).  
It would be too hasty, however, to dismiss the problem entirely, for it may very well arise in many 
of the specifications used in the literature. For instance, the omission of fixed effects in the 
production function in levels is likely to cause trouble even in the model described by equations (8), 
(16) and (17). In this case, the composite error term in (8) would be of the form (ai + ?it) and its time 
invariant component (the fixed effect) would indeed affect pit because it will have influenced 
investment in all previous periods. Hence, pit  is very likely to be correlated with (ai + ?it), which 
will again bias its coefficient.  
Reverse causation can also be a problem when the production function is estimated in differences, 
as is often done, partly to remove the fixed effects bias. We now have 
  (18) ?yit = gi +??pit + a?kit + ??it  
where we are allowing for the possibility that the rate of technical progress, g, may differ across 
countries. If equation (18) is well specified, its disturbance term ??it should only contain true 
random shocks to the growth rate that cannot be anticipated by governments and should not 
therefore feed back into ?pit through (16) and (17). But if this is not the case and the error term 
contains some systematic component of the growth rate that agents can anticipate (e.g. a fixed 
country effect in rates of technical progress), we may well find that ?pit is again correlated with the 
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(enlarged) disturbance, particularly if the period over which we are computing growth rates is long 
enough for induced changes in investment rates to work their way through to the stock of public 
capital. 
 
 Data quality problems 
Another common concern in the literature we will review is the poor quality of the data. The 
problem is likely to be particularly acute in the case of cross-country studies. One reason is that 
public investment includes rather different things in different countries because government 
involvement in educational and health care systems is more intense in some places than others. 
Other source of noise is the existence of multiple administrations and public enterprises, whose 
investment may not be captured by the existing statistics in a consistent way. Finally, existing data 
on stocks of infrastructures or public capital are generally scarce and may not be comparable across 
countries because of methodological differences in their construction. All these factors are likely to 
introduce a significant amount of measurement error in many existing data sets on public 
investment flows or public capital stocks. As is well known, this will in turn bias the relevant 
coefficient towards zero.7 
 
 3. Time series studies with national data 
Ratner (1983) provides one of the first existing estimates of an aggregate production function that 
includes public capital as an input.8 After adjusting the stocks of private and public capital by the 
rate of capacity utilization, this author estimates a production function in levels with annual data 
for the private sector of the US economy and finds that the coefficient of public capital is positive 
and significant although fairly small (0.056). (See equation [1] of Table 1). Using a very similar 
specification with longer time series for the same country, Ram and Ramsey (R&R, 1989) and 
Aschauer (1989a) estimate a much larger coefficient for this variable (equations [2] and [3] in Table 
1).9 This last author also disaggregates the public capital stock and finds that the types of 
infrastructure with the largest impact on productivity are those having to do with transport and the 
supply of energy and water. 
The work of Aschauer has received a considerable deal of attention and can be considered the point 
of departure of the large literature on the subject. Perhaps the main reason for its great impact is 
that it appeared at a time when both academics and policy-makers were searching without success 
for the causes of the alarming productivity slowdown that started in the mid 1970s in most 
                                                           
7 For a discussion of the effects of measurement error (in a slightly different context) see de la Fuente and 
Doménech (2006a). 
8 There is an earlier attempt by Mera (1973) using regional Japanese data, but it is hard to compare with the 
more recent literature. 
9 Wylie (1996) essentially replicates Aschauer's analysis with Canadian data obtaining similar results. The 
coefficient of public capital is extremely large (0.517) and exceeds the one on private capital. 
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industrial countries. In this context, Aschauer's results were quite appealing for they provided a 
plausible diagnosis of the problem and a simple policy prescription: increase public investment in 
infrastructure. (See Munell, 1990a). 
 
Table 1: Time series estimates of the production function with aggregate US data 
___________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 ?k [0.234] [0.242] [0.26] 
 ?p 0.056 0.240 0.39 
 (2.70) (4.38) (16.23) 
 ?l 0.710 0.518 0.35 
 (12.62) (10.37) (4.85) 
R2 0.969 0.94 0.976 
variables in: levels levels levels 
other vars.: t(+) energy 
prices (-), 
t(+), cu 
cu(+), t(+) 
country: USA USA USA 
period: 1949-73 1948-85 1945-85 
source: Ratner 
(1983) 
R&R 
(1989) 
Aschauer 
(1989a)  
___________________________________ 
   Notes: 
- t statistics inside parentheses below each coefficient. 
- The coefficients that appear within brackets are estimated indirectly, using the assumptions on the degree of 
returns to scale of the production function made by each author. Ratner and R&R assume that the production 
function displays constant returns to scale in private and public capital and labor. Aschauer imposes the same 
assumption after testing the implied restriction on the coefficients. 
- Other variables: cu is an index of capacity utilization and t a trend. The symbol "+" (-) inside parentheses 
indicates that the coefficient of the variable is positive (negative) and significant, (0) means that the coefficient 
is not significantly different from zero.  
 
Aschauer's conclusions, however, were soon questioned on various grounds. Several authors have 
argued that his estimate of the elasticity of output with respect to public capital is too high to be 
credible and suggested that his results may be due to various econometric problems.10 A first 
difficulty is the possibility of reverse causation. In this interpretation, public investment would be a 
superior good and the observed correlation between this variable and productivity growth would 
simply reflect the fact that governments tend to invest more in periods of rapid growth. Aschauer, 
however, is aware of this possibility and supplies some evidence that this is not the problem. First, 
he observes that his results do not change substantially when public capital is lagged. Moreover, if 
there were a reverse causation problem, we would expect to see a strong correlation between 
productivity growth and many components of public consumption and investment. A significant 
positive correlation, however, is only found for the component of public investment that is devoted 
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to productive infrastructure. As we will see below, Fernald (1999) uses sectoral data to provide 
additional evidence that causation runs from infrastructure investment to productivity growth, and 
not the other way around. His key finding is that increases in the stock of roads seem to induce 
faster productivity growth in those industries that are more intensive users of such infrastructures -
- a pattern we would not expect to find if causation ran from output growth to public investment. 
A second and probably more serious objection is that Aschauer's analysis does not control for other 
possible determinants of productivity growth. As Holtz-Eakin (1994) observes, the American 
postwar data Aschauer used contain essentially a single observation: the simultaneous fall in public 
investment and productivity growth that starts in the mid 1970s. It is possible, however, that this 
pattern is only a coincidence. The fall in the US rate of public investment at the beginning of this 
decade seems to be due mostly to two factors: the completion of the interstate highway network, 
and the stabilization and subsequent decrease in the school-age population (Gramlich, 1994). On 
the other hand, the productivity slowdown could be the result of the rapid increase in energy prices 
following the oil shocks of the 70s and 80s, which may have rendered obsolete a significant fraction 
of the private capital stock,11 or of some other factor. In any event, the coincidence of the two 
processes may be due to chance, and the apparent significance of public investment may simply 
reflect the fact that this variable serves as a proxy for some other omitted factor/s which would be 
the true cause of the problem. The results of Ford and Poret (1991) would seem to be consistent 
with this interpretation. These authors replicate Aschauer's analysis for eleven OECD countries and 
find a significant positive correlation between public investment and productivity growth only in 
half the cases.12 
The third criticism of Aschauer's work takes us to relatively complex econometric issues. Some 
studies argue that Aschauer's results may be an example of the "spurious regressions" problem 
discussed by Granger and Newbold (1974).13 These authors argue that in many cases the 
apparently good results of regressions in levels between non-stationary variables (i.e. between 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
10 Munnell (1992), for instance, finds it difficult to believe that the coefficient of public capital may be larger 
than that of private capital -- particularly because a large part of public investment finances "non-productive" 
activities which are not captured by existing national income statistics.  
11 Tatom (1991b) (cited in Hurst (1994)) finds that controlling for the price of oil reduces the coefficient of 
public capital in Aschauer's specification to one third. R&R (1989), however, still obtain a very large coefficient 
for public capital after controlling for energy prices (equation [2] in Table 1). 
12 A second fact that seems to point in the same direction is the dramatic difference between Aschauer's 
estimates and those of Ratner, which are obtained with a shorter sample. It must be noted, however, that the 
US infrastructures series used by both authors underwent a major revision prior to Aschauer's work. Hurst 
(1994) reports that Tatom (1991b) has reestimated Radner's model (using his specification and the original 
sample period) with the revised series and obtains a coefficient of 0.28 for public capital, which is closer to 
Aschauer's estimate than to Radner's original result. 
13 See Aaron (1990), Hulten and Schwab (1991), Jorgenson (1991) and Tatom (1991a,b). These authors find that 
public capital loses its significance when a specification in first differences is used. 
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variables which display a trend) are not reliable and suggest the use of a specification in first 
differences in order to obtain consistent estimates.14  
When this is done, the results are often, but not always, less favorable to the hypothesis that 
infrastructure investment has a substantial effect on productivity growth. This is illustrated by the 
difference between equations [1] and [2] of Table 2, taken from Serra and García-Fontes (SGF, 1994), 
who work with aggregate data for Spain. When the data are differenced, the estimated 
infrastructure coefficient is reduced by a third and loses its significance. This pattern, however, 
does not hold in the case of Portugal, where the coefficient of interest is essentially the same in both 
specifications (see equations [6] and [7] in Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Time series estimates of the production function, Spain and Portugal 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 ?k 0.40 0.45 [0.42] [0.18] 0.613 0.374 [0.320] 0.443 
 (15.64) (5.29)   (9.48) (16.06)  (15.81) 
 ?p 0.27 0.18 0.19* 0.60 0.290 0.186 0.199 0.387 
 (11.69) (1.02)  (7.74) (4.52) (3.15) (2.03) (7.43) 
 ?l 0.59 0.55 0.39* 0.22 0.290 0.667 0.481 0.104 
 (10.70) (2.91)  (10.86) (4.52) (5.10) (4.51 (0.39) 
R2 0.99 0.85 0.99  0.998 0.998   
variables in: levels diffs. levels levels levels levels diffs levels 
Estimation: OLS OLS coint. coint. coint. OLS OLS coint. 
other vars.: cu(+)  cu(+)   cu, rev cu, rev cu, rev 
country: Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Portugal Portugal Portugal 
period: 1969-88 1969-88 1964-88 1964-89 1964-89 1965-95 1965-95 1965-95 
source: SGF 
(1993) 
SGF 
(1993) 
Bajo-Sosv. 
(1993) 
Arg. et al 
(1993)  
Mas et al 
(1993a) 
Ligthart 
(2000) 
Ligthart 
(2000) 
Ligthart 
(2000) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
    Notes: 
- t statistics inside parentheses below each coefficient. 
- Bajo and Sosvilla report the Wald statistics proposed by Phillips and Hansen rather than t statistics. The 
symbol (*) indicates that the coefficient is significant at 1%. 
- The coefficients that appear within brackets are estimated indirectly, using assumptions on the degree of 
returns to scale of the production function.  
- Other variables: cu is an index of capacity utilization; rev is a dummy variable for the period 1975-85 (between 
the Portuguese revolution and the country's accession to the EU).  
- As a proxy for capacity utilization, Ligthart uses an estimate of the output gap constructed using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. This author does not allow for technical progress (implicitly assumes constant TFP), 
except in equation [7], where he includes a constant in a specification in first differences.  
 
                                                           
14 A variable is stationary if its distribution does not change over time. This excludes, for example, those 
variables which display a trend. Using Monte Carlo simulations, Granger and Newbold show that when the 
estimation is done in levels the standard inference procedures often lead to the acceptance of a spurious 
relationship between independently generated non-stationary variables. On the other hand, the estimation in 
first differences, which eliminates the trends, generally yields more reliable results. Nelson and Plosser (1982) 
find that a large number of macroeconomic series are non-stationary. This finding raises doubts about the 
validity of good deal of empirical work in macroeconomics.  
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It must also be noted that the estimation in first differences presents some shortcomings of its own. 
Munnell (1992) observes that this specification frequently yields implausible estimates of the 
parameters of private factors in the aggregate production function and argues that it would not be 
reasonable to expect a stable relationship between public investment and output growth over a one-
year period. Secondly, some recent developments in econometrics suggest that the level estimates 
may be more reliable than it was at first thought. In particular, the estimation in levels of a 
relationship between non-stationary variables works well (is consistent) when the variables are 
cointegrated, i.e. when there exists a linear combination of them that is stationary. In fact, the OLS 
estimates obtained in this situation would be better than usual in large samples, although it is also 
true that the usual significance tests lose their validity because the distribution of these estimators 
will not be the standard one.15 
The econometrics literature provides various cointegration tests and different procedures for 
estimation and inference with cointegrated variables.16 Some of these techniques have been applied 
in the public capital literature. Table 2 summarizes the results of four studies that make use of 
cointegration techniques with Spanish and Portuguese data. Bajo and Sosvilla (1993) use the public 
capital stock series supplied in the MOISEES data base (Corrales and Taguas, 1991), while Argimón 
et al (1993) and Mas et al (1993) work with series which reflect a more restrictive concept of 
productive public capital or infrastructures. Although the estimation techniques differ and the 
exposition is not always clear, the results generally coincide. The existence of cointegration is 
accepted in most cases. Hence, the consistency of the estimates is guaranteed, and the hypothesis of 
spurious regressions can be rejected. The estimated coefficient of public capital is quite high and 
seems to be significant.17 The application of these new techniques, however, does not conclusively 
establish Aschauer's thesis for, among other problems, the estimated coefficients vary considerable 
across studies and are not always reasonable when interpreted as output elasticities.18 
 
                                                           
15 Let xt and yt be two non-stationary series. In general, the variable et  = yt - a - bxt is not stationary, but it may 
be so if there exists some value of b which makes the two trends "cancel each other." In that case, we say that xt 
and yt are cointegrated. Stock (1987) shows that the OLS estimators in levels are superconsistent when there is 
cointegration, i.e. that they converge to the true value of the parameter as the size of the sample increases and 
do so faster than under the standard assumptions.  
16 Cointegration tests are basically a test of the stationarity of the residual of a regression in levels. For an 
introduction to cointegration and related issues and additional references see Griffiths, Carter and Judge (1993, 
chapter 21) or Maddala (1992, chapter 14). 
17 Two of the studies report t statistics without much of an explanation. On the basis of our discussion, 
however, this statistic would not be the most appropriate one to determine the significance of the estimated 
coefficients. 
18 There are a number of other studies that analyze the relationship between public capital and productivity in 
different countries using cointegration techniques.  Among others, see Mamatzakis (1999) for Greece, Otto and 
Voss (1996) for Australia, Flores de Frutos et al (1998) for Spain, Ramírez (2000) and Albala-Bertrand and 
Mamatzakis (2001) for Chile, Ramírez (2002) for Mexico, Everaert and Heylen (2001) for Belgium and 
Kavanagh (1997) for Ireland. With the exception of the last one, all of these papers estimate significant and 
relatively large positive coefficients for public capital. Some of these authors also report the results of Granger 
causality tests that suggest that causality runs from public capital to output but not in the reverse direction. 
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 Some sectoral evidence 
Fernald (1999) analyzes the impact of road construction on productivity growth using industry-
level US data. As I have already noted, his results support the view that the correlation between 
infrastructure and productivity does not reflect a reverse causation problem. If this were the case, 
we would expect to see no systematic variation across industries in the strength of the correlation. If 
road construction does increase productivity, on the other hand, the effect should be stronger in 
those sectors that are intensive users of road transport. Fernald finds that this is indeed the case and 
concludes that investment in highways is productive. As we will see, his findings are also broadly 
consistent with Aschauer's conclusions on the high rate of return on infrastructure investment, but 
with one important qualification: while the construction of the interstate highway system seems to 
have contributed substantially to productivity growth in the fifties and sixties, there are no reasons 
to expect that additional investment in roads will yield similar results. Hence, infrastructure 
investment may be subject to a saturation effect, with returns to investment dropping sharply once 
the basic networks required to articulate a territory are completed. 
Fernald starts out from an industry-level production function of the form 
  (19) Yst = AstFs(Kst,,Lst, Tst) 
where Yst is the aggregate output of sector s at time t, K is private non-vehicle capital and T 
measures internal transport services. Transport services are produced combining vehicles (Vit) and 
public road capital (Pt), which is a shared input for all sectors, through a Cobb-Douglas technology 
that is common to all industries: 
  (20) Tst = Vst
a Pt
b.  
Substituting (20) into (19) and differentiating totally with respect to time, it is easy to obtain the 
following expression: 
  (21) ?yst = ?ast + ?sk ?kst  + ?sl ?lst + ?sv ?vst + ?sp ?pt 
where the ?'s denote growth rates and ?si is the elasticity of output with respect to the i-th input in 
sector s. Fernald assumes constant returns to scale in private inputs (K, L and V) and perfectly 
competitive markets. Under these conditions, the elasticity of output with respect to each factor 
(?si) is equal to the input's share in output (?si). Using this result and data on factor shares, he 
computes a Solow residual or extended TFP growth measure which includes the contribution of 
road capital by 
  (22) ?bst = ?yst -  ?sk ?kst  - ?sl ?lst -  ?sv ?vst. 
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Combining equations (21) and (22), the growth rate of extended TFP can be written as a function of 
the technological shock and the growth rate of the stock of roads: 
  (23) ?bst = ?ast + ?sp ?pt. 
This equation can be rewritten in a way that makes use of cross-industry variations in the share of 
vehicle capital in output by noting that, under the previous assumptions, the elasticity of sectoral 
output with respect to the stock of roads turns out to be proportional to this share. Notice that 
  (24) ? sp ?
Fp
sP
Fs
=
Fp
sP
Fv
sV
Fv
sV
Fs
=
FT
sbVs
aPb
FT
saVs
aPb
?sv = ??sv  
with ? = b/a. Substituting this expression in (23), 
  (25) ?bst = ?ast + ??sv ?pt 
we see that the impact of infrastructures on productivity growth will be larger in vehicle-intensive 
sectors. Notice that equation (25) can be used to recover estimates of the elasticity of sectoral 
outputs with respect to the stock of roads. Since the average vehicle share (?sv) is 1.6%, the average 
output elasticity will be given by 0.016*?.  
Fernald estimates equation (25) after transforming it in a way that seeks to avoid the endogeneity 
bias arising from the possible correlation between productivity growth (which depends in part on 
the unobservable technological shocks ?ast) and the demand for public capital. He uses a SUR 
specification (with a different equation for each sector), imposing the equality of ? across equations 
and working with different industry disaggregations. He also allows the value of ? to change over 
time by introducing a dummy variable for the second part of the sample period (1974-89), when the 
construction of the interstate highway system had been largely completed. 
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 3. When ? is constrained to adopt a single value for 
the entire sample period (equations [1] and [4]), the coefficient is positive, significant, and quite 
large, implying an average elasticity of output with respect to road capital of around 0.35. When the 
coefficient is allowed to vary over time, the earlier result is preserved for the first half of the sample 
period, but the coefficient is not significantly different from zero in the period after 1973. In the 
preferred specification, which controls for congestion in a rather ad-hoc way (equation [5]), the 
point estimate of the elasticity of output with respect to road capital drops from 0.27 in the first half 
of the sample period to 0.085 in the second, and the latter coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero. 
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Table 3: Fernald (1999) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 ? 22.1  22.9   
  [3.3]  [3.6]   
 ?1953-73   17.4  19.3 17.1 
   [4.0]  [4.3] [3.1] 
 ??1974-89   -25.3  -14.7  
   [11.2]  [10.0]  
 ?1974-89     5.3 
      [4.5] 
 data for: 9 ind group 9 ind group 1-digit  SIC 1-digit  SIC 9 ind group 
 congestion effect: no no no no yes for >1973 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
     Notes: 
- Standard errors in brackets below each coefficient. 
- Aggregation: nine industry groupings or ten 1-digit SIC industries. Annual data for 1953 to 1989. 
- Equation [5] controls for a congestion effect after 1973 by dividing the road stock by an estimate of total miles 
driven. Evidence of congestion is found only for the second part of the sample period. 
 
Using these results, Fernald estimates that highway construction contributed about 1.4 percentage 
points to aggregate annual productivity growth before 1973 and only about 0.4 points after this 
year. Hence, infrastructure investment may indeed account for a substantial share of the observed 
slowdown in US productivity. It does not follow, however, that an increase in public investment 
will trigger substantial productivity gains in the future, as the rate of return on road construction 
seems to have fallen dramatically with the completion of the basic interstate network. 
 
 4. Cross-country evidence 
A large number of studies have explored the relationship between infrastructure and productivity 
using pooled data sets that combine observations for several years and different countries or 
regions. This section reviews the available cross-country evidence and the following one focuses on 
studies that use regional data sets for a given country. 
Using pooled data allows the researcher to exploit the cross-section variation of the data in addition 
to its time-series dimension and should mitigate some, but not all, of the econometric problems that 
arise in time-series studies for a single country. In particular, panel results are less open to the 
spurious regressions problem arising from common trends in the data.  On the other hand, relying 
on the cross-section variation in the data does not eliminate and may even aggravate the reverse 
causation problem that may affect studies of the productivity effects of public capital. The direction 
of the bias, however, is not clear ex-ante and will depend on the way public investment is financed. 
At the country level, it seems likely that rich nations will demand more public capital than poor 
ones, a fact that is likely to generate an upward bias in the estimated coefficient of public capital. A 
similar situation will tend to arise within a given country if regional governments are financed by 
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"domestic" tax revenues, but the bias may be reversed if infrastructure investment is financed 
centrally and is used as a mechanism for regional redistribution. As we have seen, in order to avoid 
the potential endogeneity bias, it is important to control for fixed country or regional effects, as 
their omission will generate a correlation between the error term and infrastructure variables that 
will render OLS estimates of production function coefficients inconsistent.  
 
 4.1. Production functions 
Working with panel data for the G7 and a specification in first differences, Aschauer (1989b) reports 
results that are quite similar to those of his previously cited study. (See equation [1] in Table 4). His 
estimates, however, are somewhat problematic. Since data on capital stocks are not available for all 
the countries in the sample, Aschauer uses the share of private and public investment in GDP as 
proxies for the corresponding stocks. In the absence of further corrections (as dictated for instance 
by a full structural convergence equation specification), this procedure would only be valid if the 
capital-output ratio remained constant both over time and across countries, which seems unlikely. 
Secondly, Aschauer estimates a regression equation with a single constant term, which amounts to 
imposing a constant rate of technical progress for all countries and periods. Since public investment 
is the variable with the clearest downward trend of all regressors, its coefficient will tend to pick up 
the decline in the rate of productivity growth in this specification, yielding a positive coefficient for 
public capital which, once more, may reflect a spurious correlation between this variable and the 
growth rate of output.19 
Evans and Karras (E&K, 1994a) undertake a similar exercise with panel data for a sample of seven 
countries but investigate the sensitivity of the results to different specifications. As in the previous 
study, a production function specification in first differences without country or period effects 
(equation [2] in Table 4) yields a positive and significant coefficient of public capital, although much 
smaller than the one reported by Aschauer. This coefficient, however, loses its significance (and in 
fact becomes negative) when we add period or country effects (see equations [3] and [4]). On the 
other hand, the coefficients of some of the private factors also adopt implausible values with these 
specifications. 
Kamps (2006) constructs estimates of net stocks of public capital for 22 OECD countries using 
investment data from the OECD Analytical Database and a perpetual inventory procedure with 
geometric depreciation. He estimates a Cobb-Douglas production function in first differences using  
                                                           
19 Aschauer (1994) also provides some panel estimates. His results are, in general terms, quite positive, even 
when he includes fixed period and country effects, but are not directly comparable with those of the studies 
discussed in this section. In this paper Aschauer estimates, among other specifications, a convergence equation 
in which the dependent variable is the rate of growth of output per employed worker and the regressors 
include the initial value of output per worker and the growth rate of the stock of public capital, but not the 
growth rate of the private capital stock or the private investment rate. Hence, the estimated coefficients would 
presumably incorporate an indirect effect that would capture the impact of public investment on growth 
through the induced increase in private investment. 
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Table 4: Production function estimates with panel data at the national level 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 ?k 0.24 0.348 0.251 0.230 0.26 0.22 
 [0.05] [0.110] [0.140] [0.146] n.r. (2.1) 
 ?p 0.41 0.182 -0.103 -0.108 0.223 0.13 
 [0.13] [0.085] [0.097] [0.100] (4.83) (2.0) 
 ?l 0.65 0.637 0.387 0.394 0.57 0.66 
 [0.08] [0.103] [0.099] [0.103] n.r. (5.6) 
R2 0.61 n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.  
variables in: differences differences differences differences differences levels 
country effects: no no no random no fixed 
time effects: no no fixed fixed no trend 
sample: G7 7 DCs 7 DCs 7 DCs 22 OECD 28 LDCs 
period: 1966-85 1963-88 1963-88 1963-88 1960-2001 1981-91 
other variables: CU(0), 
DOIL(-) 
    OPEN (+), 
USA (+), 
HC (+) 
source: Aschauer 
(1989b) 
Evans & 
Karras 
(1994a) 
Evans & 
Karras 
(1994a) 
  Evans & 
Karras 
(1994a) 
Kamps 
(2006) 
Dessus & 
Herrera 
(2000) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
    Notes: 
- Standard errors (within brackets) or t statistics (in parentheses) below each coefficient. 
- Other variables: CU = capacity utilization; DOIL = dummy variable for the years of the oil crises (1974 and 
1979). 
- The sample used by Evans and Karras includes Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Greece, the UK and the 
US. 
- Kamps only reports t statistics for public capital but does indicate that the rest of the coefficients are 
significant at 5%. 
- n.r. = not reported. 
- Dessus and Herrera: Equation [6] is estimated by three-stage least squares as part of a simultaneous equation 
model. OPEN is a measure of openness, USA is an indicator of TFP in the US and HC the stock of human 
capital, measured by average years of schooling. 
 
 
both his own series and data from earlier national and OECD estimates that relied on different 
estimation procedures in different countries. Kamps reports that results for individual countries 
generally improve when his data are used. When data from OECD (1997) are used (which are 
available for a subsample of 12 countries), the estimated coefficient of public capital is negative in 
four cases and not statistically significant in six more, leaving only two countries with positive and 
significant infrastructure coefficients. When the exercise is repeated with Kamps' data, the 
counterintuitive negative signs disappear and the estimated coefficients are significant in five out of 
twelve cases (and in 12 out of 22 cases for the entire sample). The author also indicates, however, 
that country-level equations often produce implausible estimates of labor coefficients, possibly due 
to severe multicollinearity problems. To avoid such problems, he pools the data obtaining a 
preferred specification (shown in equation [5] in Table 4) that yields plausible and significant 
coefficients for private inputs and an estimate of 0.22 for the elasticity of output with respect to 
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public capital. This estimate is close to the one obtained by Evans and Karras (1994a) using a similar 
specification. Unfortunately, however, Kamps does not investigate the robustness of his results to 
the introduction of fixed period effects.  
Seeking to avoid endogeneity bias, Dessus and Herrera (2000) estimate a production function with 
public capital as part of a simultaneous equation model that includes two equations describing the 
accumulation of private and public capital that are derived from a flexible accelerator model. The 
production function includes human capital (measured by average years of schooling) as an input 
and controls for an openness indicator and for an index of TFP in the US as proxies for technical 
progress. Public capital is interpreted in a broad sense as the accumulated investment of all public 
administrations and government-owned enterprises. The system is estimated by three-stage least-
squares and includes fixed country effects and country-specific trends. The estimated output 
elasticities are shown in equation [6] of Table 4. The coefficient of public capital is positive and 
significant but, as may be reasonably expected, it is also significantly smaller than the coefficient of 
private capital. The authors report that their results imply very similar rates of return for public and 
private capital (14.2% and 14.9% respectively). Hence, they conclude that while public capital does 
seem to be rather productive, there are no signs of a shortage of this input. 
Estefahani and Ramírez (2003) and Yeaple and Golub (2007) also develop and estimate 
simultaneous equation models that endogenize investment in infrastructures. Yeaple and Golub 
use data for a sample of 10 industrial sectors in 18 developing and developed countries to analyze 
the effect of three types of infrastructures (roads, telecommunications and power supply) on 
productivity and on the pattern of sectoral specialization. They find that roads have a positive effect 
on productivity in practically all sectors, while telecommunications and power infrastructures have 
significant effects only in a few cases. Infrastructure stocks also seem to affect the sectoral 
composition of manufacturing output. Estefahani and Ramírez (2003) use data on aggregate output 
and stocks of telecommunications and power supply infrastructures in a sample of 75 countries. 
They find positive, significant and rather high output elasticities for both types of infrastructures 
(between 0.078 and 0.095 for telephones and between 0.128 and 0.156 for power generation 
facilities). 
 
 Physical infrastructure indicators 
Canning (1998) constructs a data set on physical infrastructure indicators that covers the period 
1950-95 for a large sample of countries. He collects, collates and homogenizes data from a variety of 
sources on kilometers of (total and paved) roads and railway lines, number of telephones and 
telephone main lines and electricity generating capacity. 
Canning (1999) and Canning and Bennathan (C&B, 2000) use these data and additional variables 
(taken generally from the Summers and Heston data set and from Barro and Lee, 1993) to 
investigate the contribution of infrastructure investment to productivity growth using panel 
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cointegration techniques developed by Kao and Chiang (1997). Both studies estimate an error-
correction specification that takes the form of a production function in first differences augmented 
with lag and lead terms to allow for short-run dynamics around the long-run relationship between 
inputs and outputs described by the production function. The coefficients of the production 
function (which includes fixed period effects and implicitly allows for fixed country effects) are 
assumed to be the same for all countries, while the short-run coefficients (i.e. those of the lead and 
lag terms) are allowed to vary across territories. The authors argue that this procedure should help 
mitigate any potential reverse causation problems. They contend that while it is plausible to assume 
that the technical relationship described by the production function is stable across countries, the 
feedback relationship from income to factor demands will most likely vary across countries and 
will therefore be picked up by the short-run coefficients. Hence, while there may be two 
cointegration relations between output and factor stocks for each individual country, only the 
forward one, from inputs to outputs, should hold uniformly when the data are pooled. 
Table 5: Canning and Bennathan (2000) 
___________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 ?k 0.392 0.371 0.365 
 (11.90) (8.58) (6.41) 
 ?h 0.059 0.035 0.112 
 (1.54) (0.64) (1.57) 
roads 0.048 0.03 0.117 
 (2.30) (0.12) (3.73) 
electricity 0.057 0.012 0.134 
 (3.13) (0.50) (4.05) 
sample: 62 ctries. low 
income, 31 
countries 
higher 
income, 31 
countries 
___________________________________________________ 
     Notes: 
-  t statistics in parentheses below each coefficient. 
- roads is kilometers of paved roads per worker. 
- Other variables: Physical capital stocks are constructed by accumulating investment flows using Summers and 
Heston data and assuming a depreciation rate of 7%. Human capital is proxied by average years of schooling, 
taken from Barro and Lee (1993). 
- Constant returns to scale are assumed. The coefficient of labor is not estimated directly but recovered using 
this assumption (as 1 minus the sum of the rest of the elasticities). 
 
Table 5 shows some of the results obtained in the second of these studies using a Cobb-Douglas 
specification and yearly data.20 To interpret the table, it should be noted that infrastructure stocks 
                                                           
20 One of the main differences between Canning (1999) and Canning and Bennathan (C&B, 2000) is that the 
first paper includes among the regressors an indicator of the number of telephone lines. This variable is very 
significant and its inclusion tends to drive out the rest of the infrastructure indicators. C&B argue that the 
phone variable should be dropped because its significance is likely to be driven by demand effects. They argue 
that its estimated coefficient is entirely implausible as it would imply rates of return to investment in telephone 
lines of the order of 10,000%. 
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enter the production function twice, directly and though the stock of physical capital, in which they 
are included. Hence, an insignificant coefficient of the infrastructure variables will indicate that this 
factor is just as productive as other types of physical capital, and a positive and significant 
coefficient would suggest that an increase in infrastructure will increase output holding constant 
the total stock of capital. All infrastructure variables are expressed in per worker terms. They are 
physical indicators, of kilometers of paved roads and installed generating capacity (kilowatts). 
C&B first estimate the model using the entire sample and then repeat the exercise after splitting the 
sample by income levels. Their results suggest that infrastructure investment does contribute to 
productivity but that "extra returns" over and above those available from other types of investment 
can only be found in relatively rich countries.21 
To complete their analysis in a way that allows them to calculate rates of return on investment, the 
authors also compile data on the construction cost of different infrastructures. Their calculations 
suggest a complex pattern with very significant differences across countries in both construction 
costs and rates of return. For a majority of countries, the expected rates of return on infrastructure 
investment are comparable with or even below those on other types of physical capital. There are 
some countries, however, where the returns to infrastructure appear to be quite high in relative 
terms either because there seem to be shortages of infrastructures relative to other inputs or because 
construction costs are rather low. These countries are mostly middle-income developing countries. 
 
 4.2. Cross-country growth equations 
This section reviews some results on the growth effects of public investment that have been 
obtained as part of broader cross-country analyses of the determinants of economic growth. The 
empirical model estimated in most of these papers is a non-structural growth equation relating the 
growth rate of output to a set of explanatory variables which typically includes initial income per 
capita, some measure of investment in physical and human capital, the rate of population growth 
and possibly other regressors chosen from a long list of potential determinants of output growth 
(including such things as measures of political or social instability, openness to international trade 
and many other macroeconomic indicators). Different fiscal variables are then added to this 
benchmark specification, either one at a time or in different combinations, in order to establish their 
partial correlation with output growth. 
                                                           
21 Canning and Bennathan (2000) also estimate a translog production function (but only separately for each 
infrastructure indicator at a time plus the standard inputs). The results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 5 but this more flexible functional form allows them to investigate the pattern of 
complementarity or substitutability across inputs (which is very severely restricted by the Cobb-Douglas 
assumption). The results suggest that both roads and electricity generating capacity are complementary with 
physical and human capital, and that diminishing returns are strong in both types of infrastructure alone (ie. 
they estimate positive cross product terms and negative square terms). 
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Some of the studies I will review make some effort to identify the channels through which fiscal 
policy measures affect growth by changing the set of conditioning variables. A common approach 
involves comparing the coefficient of the variable of interest in two different growth regressions, 
one that controls for the investment rate (and/or other immediate sources of growth), and a second 
one which does not. If the variable of interest has a smaller coefficient and/or loses significance 
when the investment rate is introduced as a regressor, it is inferred that this variable works, at least 
in part, by stimulating investment. Otherwise, its impact on growth is attributed to its direct effect 
on productivity. These regressions are sometimes complemented by simple accumulation 
equations, with investment as the dependent variable, which are used to check whether the variable 
is indeed correlated with the rate of capital accumulation. A second and closely related procedure 
attempts to separate the "direct" impact of a given expenditure variable on growth or investment 
from the "indirect" (disincentive and crowding-out) effects that arise from its (tax or deficit) 
financing by comparing the coefficients of the expenditure indicator in two specifications, one 
which controls for public revenues and one which does not. 
One of the earliest and most thorough studies of the impact of fiscal policy on growth is the one 
undertaken by Landau in a series of three papers (1983, 1985 and 1986). To investigate the effects of 
different types of government expenditures, this author estimates a series of growth equations that 
include initial income per capita (qo) and various investment ratios among the regressors using both 
cross-section and panel data for a large number of countries. His results suggest that the expansion 
of the government sector may have contributed to the growth slowdown in the developed countries 
and retarded the development of LDCs and that the contribution of public investment to 
productivity growth is small at best and may even be negative. 
Table 6 summarizes some of the more relevant results of the latter two studies.22 Equations [1]-[3] 
are estimated using panel data for a sample of 65 LDCs. The first equation controls for government 
revenues (TAX), the budget deficit (DEFICIT) and the private investment rate (SKPR) and includes 
the public investment rate (SKG) along with other types of government expenditures. In equations 
[2] and [3] the revenue and deficit variables are omitted, and in the latter private investment is also 
excluded from the set of conditioning variables. Controlling for private investment, public revenues 
and the budget deficit, government investment seems to make a small positive (but insignificant) 
contribution to growth (equation [1]). When the revenue variables are dropped, the coefficient of 
public investment drops to zero (equation [2]). When private investment is omitted, the coefficient  
of public investment becomes negative (equation [3]). From this pattern of coefficients Landau 
concludes that the direct effects of public investment are positive but small, and that its net effect on 
                                                           
22 The first paper does not examine the impact of public investment. I report only some representative 
regressions but the results are generally quite similar when the equations are estimated with different 
subsamples (by subperiods or different income groups) or when instrumental variables techniques are used to 
deal wth potential endogeneity problems. The results are also robust to the length of the subperiod when panel 
data are used. 
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growth is insignificant or even negative once we take into account its adverse impact on private 
investment and the distortions generated by its financing. The results are even more discouraging 
for a sample of 16 developed countries (equation [4]). The coefficient of public investment is now 
significantly negative in an equation that controls for private investment (and other types of public 
expenditure). 
Table 6: Main results of Landau (1985 and 1986) 
___________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 SKG 0.098 0.004 -0.021 -0.197 
  (1.24) (0.008) (0.47) (2.98) 
 TAX -0.079    
  (1.12)    
 DEFICIT -0.066    
  (1.48)    
 SKPR 0.08 0.059  0.074 
  (1.90) (1.37)  (1.88) 
 SH 0.031 0.0032 0.034 0.015 
  (4.80) (4.87) (5.03) (4.71) 
 qo -0.307 -0.311 -0.281 -0.0014 
  (4.26) (4.80) (4.59) (8.60) 
 N 151 151 151 375 
 R2 0.741 0.714 0.710 0.65 
 Data panel  panel  panel  panel 
  4-yr 4-yr 4-yr annual 
 Period: 1960-80 1960-80 1960-80 1952-76 
 Sample 65 LDCs 65 LDCs 65 LDCs 16 OECD 
 Source: (1986) (1986) (1986) (1985) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
    Notes: 
- t statistics in parentheses below each coefficient. N is the number of observations or the degrees of freedom of 
the equation. The dependent variable is the average growth rate of real income per capita. 
-  SH is investment in human capital, proxied by a weighted average of the primary, secondary and university 
enrollment rates. 
- Other control variables (coefficients not reported in the table): Equations [1]-[3]: log time trend, change in the 
terms of trade, contraction and recovery year dummies, dummies for Australia, Canada, Norway and 
Switzerland, public consumption net of education and defense, transfer payments, and spending on education, 
all measured as real shares in GDP. 
 Equation [4]: total population, growth rate of population, foreign aid received, distance to closest port for 
landlocked countries and average rainfall, shares of public consumption and transfers to households in GDP. 
- Fiscal variables and investment indicators are typically moving averages of three lagged years ending in the 
first year of the current subperiod. 
 
A second and highly influential set of studies is due to Barro (1991a,b). Using cross-section data for 
a sample of over seventy countries during the period 1960-85, this author estimates a series of 
growth and investment equations following essentially the same procedure as Landau. Table 7 
summarizes Barro's key results on public investment, which are somewhat more optimistic than 
Landau's. The dependent variable varies across equations and is either the growth rate of income 
per capita (GQ) or the total investment rate (SK), which includes both private and public investment 
measured as a fraction of GDP. Government investment (SKG) seems to have a positive effect on 
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growth (equations [1] and [3]) and on private investment (equation [5])23, although the relevant 
coefficients are not always significant. Controlling for total investment, however, the coefficient of 
SKG is practically zero (equations [2] and [4]), a result which suggests that public investment is 
approximately as productive as private investment. Barro is rather cautious in drawing conclusions, 
however, and argues that the relevant variable would be the stock of public capital, rather than the 
public investment ratio. Using a rough estimate of its stock as a regressor, the coefficient of public 
capital becomes insignificant in the growth equation and negative and significant in the investment 
equation (not shown in the table). 
  
Table 7: Barro (1991a, b) 
_____________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]  
 dep var =  GQ GQ GQ GQ SK  
 SKG 0.128 -0.015 0.255 -0.026 2.21  
  (1.24) (0.13) (2.80) (0.26) [0.38]  
 SK  0.073  0.106   
   (1.87)  (3.93)   
 YPC -0.0075 -0.0068 -0.0107 -0.0183 0.009  
  (7.50) (6.80) (2.49) (4.16) (0.50)  
 SH 0.0312 0.024  0.011   
  (4.22) (2.79)  0.012   
 GPOP    -0.59   
     (2.11)   
 R2 0.62 0.65 0.56 0.69 0.66  
 N 76 76 72 72 72  
 source: (1991a)  (1991a) (1991b) (1991b) (1991b)  
______________________________________________________ 
     Notes: 
- Cross-section data for 1960-85. t statistics (in parenthesis) or standard errors [in brackets] below each 
coefficient 
-  SH = secondary enrollment ratio, GPOP = growth rate of population. 
- Additional control variables:  All equations control for the real share of government consumption (net of 
defense and education expenditures) in GDP. In addition, 
Equations [1] and [2]: primary school enrollment in 1960, number of revolutions or coups per year, 
assassinations per million inhabitants per year, price deflator for investment spending, deviation of the 
investment deflator from the sample mean.  
 Equations [3]-[5]: initial income per capita squared, military expenditure as a fraction of GDP, Gastil's index of 
political rights, dummy variables for socialist and mixed economies, dummy for countries which experienced 
war or revolution during the period, and dummies for Africa and Latin America.  
 
Another interesting paper on fiscal policy and growth is the one by Easterly and Rebelo (1993). 
These authors follow a somewhat different approach than either Barro or Landau. Instead of 
seeking precise estimates of the growth effects of various fiscal instruments, they concentrate in 
trying to identify "robust" empirical regularities. In fact, one of their main conclusions is that 
                                                           
23 The dependent variable in equation [5] it the total investment ratio, which includes public and private 
investment. Since the coefficient of the public investment variable is significantly larger than one, the estimate 
implies that private investment increases with public investment. 
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reliable "structural" estimates may be very difficult to obtain due to the presence of severe 
multicollinearity in the data and the existence of endogeneity problems. 
 
Table 8: Impact on growth and private investment of public investment 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  [1G] [1I]  [2G] [2I] 
 dependent variable = GQ SKPR  GQ SKPR 
[1] total consolidated public investment 0.04 -0.194  -0.004 -0.241 
  (1.02) (2.08)  (0.89) (2.57) 
 public investment by level of 
government: 
     
[2] general government 0.453 1.008  0.388 0.771 
  (4.13) (3.89)  (3.18) (2.88) 
[3] public enterprises -0.001 -0.623  -0.13 -0.63 
  (0.01) (3.40)  (1.15) (3.04) 
 sectoral public investment:      
[4] agriculture -0.231 -0.943  -0.304 -0.74 
  (1.13) (2.64)  (1.36) (2.24) 
[5] education 1.49 1.987  1.18 1.96 
  (2.26) (1.29)  (1.60) (1.40) 
[6] health 0.011 0.027  -0.37 2.29 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.49) (1.95) 
[7] housing and urban infrastructure 1.49 2.108  0.91 1.01 
  (2.82) (1.65)  (1.48) (0.85) 
[8] transport and communications 0.661 0.01  0.626 -0.17 
  (2.48) (0.00)  (2.48) (0.43) 
[9] industry and mining 0.218 -0.351  0.082 -0.359 
  (1.39) (1.35)  (0.53) (1.14) 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Notes: 
- t statistics in parentheses  below each coefficient 
- Conditioning variables:  Equations [1] = per capita real GDP in 1960, primary and secondary enrollment rates 
in 1960, assassinations per million, revolutions and coups and war casualties per capita) and share of 
government consumption in GDp. Equations [2] = same as in [1] plus M2/GDP and trade share in GDP. 
- Panel data with decade averages, 1960-90. The number of countries for which data are available varies across 
decades. 
 
After exploring the impact of various fiscal indicators, Easterly and Rebelo undertake an analysis of 
the growth effects of public investment using a new and fairly detailed data set on public capital 
expenditures by sector and level of government compiled by them using in-house World Bank 
reports. They start out from two benchmark growth and investment equations to which they 
subsequently add different public investment indicators one at a time. The benchmark equations 
are regressions of the growth of income per capita (GQ) and the private investment rate (SKPR) on 
initial per capita GDP, the primary and secondary enrollment ratios, the share of government 
consumption in GDP and three measures of political and social instability (assassinations per 
capita, revolutions and coups, and war casualties per capita). Columns [1G] and [1I] of Table 8 
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report the coefficients of different public investment variables when these are added one at a time 
to the benchmark growth and investment equations. As a quick check on the statistical robustness 
of these results, the estimation is repeated in columns [2G] and [2I] in Table 8 after adding two new 
control variables to the equations (the ratio of M2 to GDP and the share of foreign trade in GDP). 
The results show a rather mixed pattern and suggest that disaggregation may be important for 
understanding the impact of government investment on growth. Total consolidated public 
investment (including investment by public enterprises) seems to have virtually no effect on 
growth and tends to crowd out private investment (equation [1]). These adverse results, however, 
seem to be due to investment by public enterprises (equation [3]), as capital expenditures 
undertaken directly by the public administrations (equation [2]) are positive and significantly 
correlated with growth and private investment. When investment is disaggregated by sectors 
(equations [4]-[9]) several of its components have large positive effects. Although some of these 
positive coefficients are sensitive to the introduction of new conditioning variables in columns [2G] 
and [2I] (in particular, those of education and urban infrastructure, shown in rows [5] and [7]), 
investment in transport and communications has a robust positive effect on productivity growth 
(though not on private investment). The coefficients of this last variable and of general government 
investment, moreover, remain significant when these variables are instrumented to correct potential 
endogeneity problems.24 
Hulten (1996), Rieber (1999) and Milbourne et al (MOV, 2003) estimate structural convergence 
equations derived from an extension of Mankiw, Romer and Weil's (MRW, 1992) generalized Solow 
model that includes public capital as a separate input. Rieber (1999) uses a variant of the MRW 
model (without human capital) in which the convergence equation is written in terms of the stock 
of public capital (rather than the public investment ratio) and divides the stock of public capital by 
the stock of private capital in order to capture congestion effects. He estimates the model using 
annual data for a panel of 12 OECD countries covering the period 1970-93. To avoid the small 
sample bias that can affect the estimation of the convergence coefficient in dynamic panels,25 he 
uses a specification proposed by Holtz-Eakin (1993c) that involves pooling increasingly longer 
differences of the data starting from a fixed initial date. He initially allows for fixed country effects 
but these turn out not to be significant. Hulten (1996) and MOV (2003) use cross-section data to 
estimate the standard version of the MRW model (written in terms of investment rates and 
including human capital). To deal with the possible simultaneity bias, MOV reestimate the model 
using IV techniques. They consider as potentially endogenous all their regressors except for initial 
income per capita and use as instruments the observed values at the beginning of the sample period 
                                                           
24 In fact, instrumental variables estimation yields extremely large positive coefficients for these two variables, 
a finding which would tend to support Aschauer's (1989a) conclusion that the rate of return on public 
investment is exceedingly high. 
25 See Nickell (1981). 
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of a series of other variables (that include the size and growth rate of the population, different 
investment indicators, the average schooling of the male and female population and an index of 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization). Finally, Hulten (1996) extends the basic model to control for the 
effectiveness with which infrastructure is operated. He assumes that this factor's contribution to 
productivity can be a function both of its quantity and of its effectiveness. As a proxy for the second 
factor, he constructs an effectiveness index that combines data on the probability that telephone 
calls are successful, power losses as a fraction of total electricity generation, the percentage of paved 
roads that is in good condition and the share of locomotives that use diesel technology.  
 
Table 9: Different estimations of MRW's model with public capital 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
ln sk  0.33 0.52 0.344 0.180 
  [0.08] [0.13] (3.60) (2.05) 
 ln sp  0.27 0.22 0.355 0.107 
  [0.11] [0.36] (2.81) (0.89) 
ln effectiveness     0.794 
     (4.24) 
 ?k 0.615 0.177 0.237 0.240 0.200 
 (11.10)     
 ?p 0.096 0.145 0.100 0.248 0.118 
 (3.53)     
R2 0.82 0.51    
Data: panel* cross-
section 
cross-
section 
cross-
section 
cross-
section 
Estimation: OLS OLS IV OLS OLS 
country effects: not signif.     
time effects: no     
sample: 12 OECD 72 ctries 72 ctries 46 LDCs 46 LDCs 
period: 1970-93 1960-85 1960-85 1970-90 1970-90 
other variables: ln q0 (-), n ln q0 (-), ln 
sh (+),n(0), 
ln q0 (-), 
n(0), ln sh (+) 
ln q0 (-), n(-), 
ln sh (+)  
ln q0 (-), n(-), 
ln sh (+) 
source: Rieber MOV MOV Hulten Hulten 
__________________________________________________________________ 
   Notes: 
- MOV do not report the coefficients of the production function, only those of the log terms in MRW's growth 
equation. I have recovered the output elasticities implied by these coefficients. 
- Other variables: all equations control for the log of initial income per capita  (ln q0) and for population growth 
(n) using a specification similar to equation (5). MOV and Hulten also control for enrollment rates as a proxy 
for investment in education (sh). 
(*) As noted in the text, the panel used by Rieber is somewhat peculiar. Each observation corresponds to an 
increasingly longer period which always starts in 1970. 
- t statistics in parentheses and standard errors in brackets. 
 
Table 9 shows the main results of these three studies. In all cases, the coefficient of public capital 
estimated by OLS with the standard specification is positive and significant (see equations [1], [2] 
and [4]), ranging 0.10 to 0.25. On the other hand, MOV's IV estimation yields inconclusive results. 
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Using IV reduces the point estimate of the coefficient of public capital, although not by much, but 
considerably increases the standard error of the estimator, causing this variable to lose its 
significance. On the other hand, the results of the Hausman test the authors use to determine 
whether IV estimation is required or not are inconclusive. Hulten's results, finally, suggest that 
having a large stock of infrastructure capital may not be enough. His effectiveness index is highly 
significant and drives out the public capital variable. When the first variable is included in equation 
[5], the size of the coefficient of public capital drops by more than two thirds and loses its 
significance. The result, however, is difficult to interpret because it seems unlikely that the 
performance measures Hulten uses to construct his efficiency index are independent of the stock of 
infrastructure. At any rate, his findings provide a useful reminder that, as Pritchett (1996) argues, 
what matters is the flow of services you get out of your stock of infrastructure, and not how much 
you spent building it. 
Devarajan et al (1996) examine the growth implications of the composition of government 
expenditure using an extension of Barro's (1990) model with two types of public spending. Since the 
production technology displays constant returns in private capital and government spending 
(while labor does not enter the production function), the reduced form of the model is of the AK 
type, and the equilibrium path involves a constant rate of growth with no transitional dynamics. 
For a constant level of public expenditure (measured as a fraction of GDP) the equilibrium growth 
rate is an inverted U-shaped function of the shares of the two components of public expenditure in 
the government budget. In the Cobb-Douglas case, the growth-maximizing expenditure shares are 
proportional to the output elasticities of the different expenditure items. As the authors emphasize, 
in this setup the coefficient of a given expenditure share in a growth equation will depend not only 
on its output elasticity but also on the level of expenditure: productive spending may actually 
decrease the growth rate if given an excessive weight in the budget because it will crowd out other 
expenditures that are even more productive at the margin. Hence, regression results may in 
principle (and conditional on the correct specification of a model that relies on rather implausible 
technological assumptions) be used to determine how spending patterns differ from an "optimum" 
that would maximize the growth rate for the given volume of total expenditure. 
In their empirical analysis, Devarajan et al (1996) use annual data for a panel of 43 LDCs to estimate 
several specifications of an equation that relates the (5-year forward moving average) growth rate 
of income per capita to the composition of (central) government spending and a set of control 
variables comprised by the share of (central) government spending in GDP, the black market 
premium on foreign exchange, a set of continent dummies and an "external shock" variable that is 
constructed as a weighted average of import and export prices and the world interest rate. They do 
not control, however, for private investment rates, human capital, population growth or (in 
coherence with their model) for initial income, although they do indicate that their results are not 
sensitive to the inclusion of this last variable. They also report some results for a sample of 21 
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developed countries. Two alternative decompositions of public spending are considered: an 
"economic" one into current and capital expenditures, and a functional one that provides data for 
four expenditure categories (defense, health, education and transport and communications). 
Table 10: Devarajan et al (1996) 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
SHSKG 0.11  -0.045 -0.059 0.072    
 (1.80)  (1.72) (3.41) (4.57)    
SHSKGP2 -0.003        
 (2.62)        
SHCURR  0.24       
  (2.39)       
SHCURR2  -0.001       
  (1.95)       
SHT&C      -0.145 -0.037 0.089 
      (3.16) (1.14) (3.50) 
sample 43 LDCs 43 LDCs 43 LDCs 43 LDCs 21 DCs 43 LDCs 43 LDCs 21 DCs 
fixed effects no no no yes no no yes no 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
       Notes: 
- SHCURR = share of current expenditures in total central government expenditures; SHSKG = public 
investment as a share of total central government expenditure, SHT&C = share of transport and 
communications in total central government spending. 
- Other explanatory variables: All equations for the sample of LDCs control for the variables indicated in the text. 
In the DC sample, the only one of these variables that is included is the weight of government spending in 
GDP. Equations [6]-[8] include as additional regressors the shares of defense, health and education in total 
government spending. The coefficients of these variables are not significantly different from zero in most 
specifications, although some significant coefficients are obtained for some further disaggregations of the 
expenditure shares. 
 
The results, summarized in Table 10, are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model 
and suggest rather different conclusions for developed countries and for LDCs. While the first 
group of countries would apparently benefit from an increase in the weight of spending in capital  
(SHSKG) or in transport and communications infrastructure (SHT&C), LDC governments seem to 
be overspending on these items. Evidence of non-linearities in the shares of capital (SHSKG) and 
current (SHCURR) expenditure is detected in equations [1] and [2], where squared terms are 
included as regressors. Rather surprisingly, most countries in the LDC sample seem to be in the 
downward-sloping branch of the inverted U curve in terms of capital expenditures and on the 
upward sloping branch in terms of current spending. The coefficient of the first variable is negative 
(equation [3]) and that of the second positive (not reported in the Table) when only linear terms are 
included in the equation. The negative coefficient on the share of capital expenditure survives (and 
is increased by) the inclusion of fixed effects in the equation (equation [4]), but is reversed for a 
sample of developed countries (equation [5]). In equations [6] and [7] the expenditure variables are 
the shares of the different functional expenditure categories. The coefficient of spending on 
transport and communications is negative and significant in equation [6] but loses its significance in 
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a fixed effects specification (equation [7]) and becomes positive and significant in the sample of 
developed countries (equation [8]). 
 
Table 11: Miscellaneous results on government and growth 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  
 dep var = GY GY GQ GQ GQ GQ  
 GCURR 0.0088       
  (0.16)       
 SKG 0.2737 -0.108      
  (2.04) (1.02)      
 SKPR 0.3279 0.158      
  (3.10) (3.27)      
 ST&C   -0.0001 -0.00044    
    (0.40) (4.54)    
 INFR.      0.012 0.0089  
      (2.08) (5.62)  
 qo     -0.00065   
      (1.53)   
 GPOP ???? 0.573 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.00012   
   (1.94) (0.98) (3.73) (0.59)   
 POL   -0.00011 -0.00011  -0.00011  
    (3.71) (4.24)  (4.85)  
 R2 0.20 0.737 0.40 0.54 0.42 0.51  
 N  38  24 57 57 57 57  
 sample 38 LDCs 24 LDCs 57 count. 57 count. 57 count. 57 count.  
 period 1980-85 1970-80 1970-85 1980-92 1970-85 1980-92  
 source: Diamond 
(1985) 
K&R 
(1990) 
S-R 
(1998) 
S-R 
(1998) 
S-R 
(1998) 
S-R 
(1998) 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
    Notes: 
- All equations estimated with cross-section data. 
- Sources: K&R = Khan and Reinhart (1990), S-R = Sánchez-Robles (1998). 
- Dependent variable: GQ = growth of output per capita; GY = growth of total output. 
- Independent  variables:  
GCURR = public current expenditures as a share of GDP;  
ST&D = government expenditure on transport, communications, fuel and energy as a share of GDP. 
POL = proxy for political instability  
GPOP = growth rate of the population (or the labor force in eqs. [1] and [2]) 
INFR = physical infrastructure index, constructed as a weighted average of several standardized measures of 
physical infrastructure units. The weights are derived from an auxiliary regression of the growth rate of 
income per capita on the principal components of the physical infrastructure indicators and a set of 
conditioning variables that differs slightly from the one used in the equations reported in the table. For the 
1970-85 sample, the infrastructure indicators are railways (Kms.?) per head, roads (Kms.?) per square Km. and 
energy production capacity per capita; for the 1980-92 sample, the railroad variable is replaced by the number 
of telephones per capita. 
- Other conditioning variables not shown in the table 
  Equation [1]: growth rate of the labor force. 
  Equation [2]: growth rate of exports  
  Equations [3]-[6]: dummy variable for NICs 
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A number of other studies have analyzed the growth effects of various types of fiscal policies using 
cross-country growth regressions with mixed and even contradictory results. Table 11 summarizes 
some of the relevant findings. Although the specifications are not fully comparable,26 Diamond's 
(1985) results (equation [1]) seem to contradict those of Devarajan et al (1996): in his sample of 
LDCs, growth increases with capital expenditures and decreases with current spending. Khan and 
Reinhart (1990) find a negative but insignificant correlation between public investment and growth 
in a sample of 24 LDCs (equation [2]). Sanchez-Robles (1998) provides some evidence that physical 
infrastructure indicators perform better in growth regressions than measures of monetary 
expenditure. Using cross-section data to estimate a growth regression for various samples, she finds 
that while the share of GDP devoted by government to investment in transport, communications 
and energy (ST&C) is not significant (equations [3] and [4]), an indicator that summarizes the initial 
endowment of public capital measured in physical units (INFR, see the notes to the table for its 
construction) does enter the equation with a positive and significant coefficient. It must be noted, 
however, that the conditioning variables change somewhat across specifications, making it difficult 
to interpret her findings. 
 
 5. Regional evidence 
Let us now turn to the evidence that is available at the regional level, starting with the US and 
continuing with Spain and other countries. As we will see, a large number of these studies conclude 
that infrastructure indicators tend to lose their significance in fixed effects or differenced 
specifications. Most of these studies, however, work with a sample of US states that starts in 1970. 
Results for the regions of Spain and other Mediterranean countries, on the other hand, tend to be 
much more optimistic, raising the possibility that a saturation effect may be at work. 
 
 5.1. Evidence for the US states 
Munnell (1990b) constructs estimates of the private and public capital stocks for the states of the 
US27 and estimates a production function with panel data using a specification in levels without 
specific effects. Her results coincide with those of Aschauer (1989a) in that the effect of the stock of 
infrastructures on productivity is positive and significant. (See equation [1] of Table 12). On the 
other hand, Munnell's estimate of the coefficient of public capital is much lower than Aschauer's 
(around 0.17 rather than 0.39). One possible explanation for this difference has to do with the 
existence of interregional spillovers which would be captured by national but not by regional 
                                                           
26 Diamond works with expenditure shares in GDP, rather than in total government spending, and controls 
for different things that Devarajan et al. 
27 The state level data on private and public capital stocks constructed by Munell (1990b), Holtz-Eakin (1993a) 
and other authors are estimates obtained by apportioning the US totals supplied by the BEA across states. 
There are state-level data on public investment flows since 1958 (from the Bureau of the Census) and on 
private investment in manufacturing that can be used to approximate a permanent inventory method at the 
state level. Alternative estimates differ mostly in the way initial state capital stocks are estimated. 
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estimates. In a second exercise (equation [2]) Munnell disaggregates the public capital stock into 
various types of infrastructures. Confirming Aschauer's results once again, she finds that the 
infrastructures having the greatest impact on productivity are roads and the water supply network. 
Another early study at the regional level which also uses US state data is the one by García-Milà 
and McGuire (1992a). These authors focus on the role of roads and educational expenditure, 
including both factors in a production function in levels with fixed period effects (equation [3] in 
Table 12). The coefficient of the stock of roads is positive and significant and its size is not very 
different from Munnell's estimate.28 
 
Table 12: Panel data results for the US States  
Munnell (1990b) and García-Milà & McGuire (1992a) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] (t) [2] (t) [3] (t) 
constant (ao) 5.70 (39.3) 5.72 (42) -4.598 (12.11) 
trend (g) 0.002 (2.70)     
?k (total stock)  0.30 (28.9) 0.31 (28.1)   
?ks (structures)     0.027 (1.55) 
?km(machinery)     0.449 (15.99) 
?l 0.59 (42.6) 0.55 (35.4) 0.465 (15.31) 
?p (total stock) 0.17 (9.4)     
?pr (roads)   0.06 (3.8) 0.044 (8.89) 
?pw  (water)   0.12 (9.6)   
?po  (other)   0.01 (0.7)   
?h (education)     0.087 (9.41) 
R2 0.99  0.993  0.995  
variables in: levels  levels  levels  
fixed effects: no  no  by period  
period: 1970-86  1970-86  1970-83  
other variables: U(-)  U(-)  E(+), Pop(+), 
Ind(-) 
 
source: Munnell 
(1990b) 
 Munnell 
(1990b) 
 G-M&M 
(1992a) 
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 Notes: 
- Other variables: U = unemployment rate; E = current expenditure on education by state governments; Ind = 
share of manufacturing in total output (average over the entire sample period for each state); Pop = total 
population. 
- García-Milà and McGuire divide the stock of road capital by the land area of the state. Their human capital 
indicator is the median years of schooling of the population aged 25 or over in each state (average of the values 
corresponding to 1970 and 1980). 
 
                                                           
28 An even earlier study is the paper by da Silva, Costa, Ellson and Martin (1987). These authors estimate a 
translog production function with cross section data for the US states in a single year. One interesting finding 
of this study, which uses a more flexible functional form than the standard one in the literature, is that the 
elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure falls with the ratio of public to private capital, or with the per 
capita stock of public capital, thus providing some evidence of a saturation effect. 
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Although the nature of the sample and the more reasonable size of the coefficients obtained in the 
two studies just cited suggest that their results may be more reliable than those of Aschauer, some 
recent papers have questioned the validity of this evidence on the basis of econometric problems 
similar to the ones we have discussed in the previous section. García-Milà and McGuire (1992b)29 
and García-Milá, McGuire and Porter (1993) estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function using 
panel data for the 48 continental US states during the period 1970-83. Table 13 summarizes the 
results obtained with different specifications of the model. The estimation in levels and without 
specific effects (equation [1]) essentially reproduces Aschauer's (1989) results.30 The coefficient of 
public capital, however, falls drastically when we add state-specific effects (equations [2] and [3]) 
and becomes negative when the model is estimated with the data in first differences (equations [4] 
to [6]). At the same time, however, the estimated coefficient of labor increases to unreasonable 
values, approaching one in the last specifications. 
 
Table 13: Panel data results for the US States  
G. Milà et al (1992 and 1993) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 ?k 0.255 0.461 0.239 0.273 0.295 0.351 
 (8.57) (6.67) (5.73) (2.80) (3.00) (3.39) 
 ?p 0.394 0.035 0.053 -0.082 -0.100 -0.121 
 (14.93) (1.19) (1.80) (1.41) (1.59) (1.55) 
 ?l 0.383 0.704 0.743 0.898 0.923 0.986 
 (10.96) (19.63) (22.27) (17.75) (17.70) (16.53) 
R2 0.985 0.947 0.956 0.468 0.448 0.415 
variables in: levels levels levels differences differences differences 
period effects: fixed fixed fixed fixed fixed fixed 
regional effects: no fixed random no random fixed 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   Notes: 
- Source: García-Milà and McGuire (1992) and García-Milà, McGuire and Porter (1993). 
- Annual data for the 48 continental US states, 1970-83. 
- t statistics in parentheses below each coefficient. 
 
García-Milà, McGuire and Porter (1993) argue that the preferred specification is the one in first 
differences with fixed state effects (equation [6]). This choice, which leads to a pessimistic 
                                                           
29 Although the title of this paper coincides with that of  García-Milá and McGuire (1992a), it is a different and 
more recent work.  
30 García-Milá and Mcguire (1992b) also experiment with a decomposition of the public capital stock into three 
categories: roads, sewage and water supply, and the rest. The impact on productivity of the first type of 
investment seems to be considerable, that of the second is still positive but smaller, and the effect of the third 
type is zero. The first two variables are significant in all the specifications in levels, but none of them maintains 
its significance in the equations in first differences. 
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conclusion regarding the impact of public investment on productivity,31 is based on the systematic 
application of various specification tests. Thus, the choice of a model in first differences is justified 
on the basis of a cointegration test for panel data, and that of a fixed effects model is based on a 
Hausman test. Finally, they run various tests for endogeneity and measurement error, rejecting the 
hypothesis that the poor results are due to these problems.  
 
Table 14: Panel data results for the US States  
G. Milà et al (1996) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 ?k 0.327 0.515 0.191 0.289 0.303 0.348 
 (10.33) (7.36) (4.61) (2.90) (3.02) (3.30) 
  ?l 0.319 0.704 0.756 0.898 0.919 0.985 
 (9.61) (20.28) (23.85) (17.64) (17.53) (16.34) 
?pr 0.370 0.127 0.120 -0.007 -0.024 -0.058 
 (18.01) (4.25) (4.51) (0.13) (0.39) (0.77) 
?pw 0.069 0.064 0.043 -0.002 -0.012 -0.029 
 (3.35) (4.07) (2.71) (0.07) (0.47) (1.07) 
?po -0.010 -0.071 -0.048 -0.056 -0.049 -0.022 
 (0.49) (3.50) (2.40) (1.63) (1.37) (0.55) 
R2 0.987 0.755 0.915 0.469 0.450 0.414 
variables in: levels levels levels differences differences differences 
period effects: fixed fixed fixed fixed fixed fixed 
regional effects: no fixed random no random fixed 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   Notes: 
- Annual data for the 48 continental US states, 1970-83. 
- t statistics in parentheses below each coefficient. 
 
García-Milà, McGuire and Porter (1996) repeat essentially the same exercise after disaggregating the 
public capital stock into three components: roads and highways (with coefficient ?pr in Table 14), 
water and sewers (?pw) and other structures (?po). The results, summarized in Table 14, are 
qualitatively similar to those reported above, although the coefficients of two of the components of 
the public capital stock (roads and water works) are positive and significant in specifications in 
levels with fixed or random effects, while the coefficient of the third component is negative and 
significant. All these variables, however, lose their significance in the specifications in differences, 
which turn out to be preferred according to various econometric tests. Balmaseda (1996a) replicates 
G. Milà et al (1996) using both the Munell (1990b) and Holtz-Eakin (1993) data sets for public capital 
at the state level and reaches similar conclusions. He also estimates some additional specifications 
                                                           
31 By contrast, the conclusion of the first two authors in the first of the cited papers (García-Milà and Mcguire, 
1992b) is moderately optimistic. In this article, the first differences specification is rejected on informal 
grounds. 
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(assuming perfect mobility of private inputs, allowing the production function coefficients to vary 
across states and disaggregating the public capital stock into its components) with similar results in 
all cases: in the preferred specification, which generally involves fixed state effects with the data in 
first differences, the public capital indicators never display a positive and significant coefficient. 
 
Table 15: Panel data results for the US states 
Evans and Karras (1994b) and Baltagi and Pinnoi (1995) 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 ?k 0.386 0.18 0.003 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.018 0.02 
 [0.016] [0.043] [0.028] (30.1) (11.62) (17.60) (0.80) (0.08) 
 ?p 0.096 -0.048 -0.029 0.16 -0.03 0.004 0.12 0.02 
 [0.021] [0.031] [0.046] (9.04) (0.90) (0.19) (2.78) (0.29) 
 ?l 0.541 0.717 0.885 0.59 0.77 0.73 0.96 1.01 
 [0.022] [0.039] [0.035] (43.2) (25.53) (29.38) (27.93) (24.83) 
vars. in: levels levels difs levels levels levels difs difs/IV 
period 
effects: 
no fixed fixed no no no no no 
regional 
effects: 
no fixed no no fixed random fixed fixed 
other 
variables: 
u(-), 
GS(+) 
u(-), 
GS(n) 
u(-), 
GS(+) 
u(-) u(-) u(-) u(-) u(-) 
         
source: E&K 
(1994b) 
E&K 
(1994b) 
E&K 
(1994b) 
B&P B&P B&P B&P B&P 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Notes: 
- Annual data for the 48 continental US states, 1970-86. 
- t statistics in parentheses or standard errors in brackets  below each coefficient. 
- Other variables: u = unemployment rate; GS = "public services," measured by the current expenditure of state 
governments on education, roads, health services, police, fire control, sewer and garbage disposal.  
- The estimated equations do not seem to include a trend or fixed time effects. In the specifications in levels 
this would amount to the implicit assumption of no technical progress. 
 
The same conclusion emerges from the work of Evans and Karras (1994b) and Baltagi and Pinnoi 
(1995) who obtain similar results using a panel of state data to estimate the production function (see 
Table 15). As usual, the public capital variable displays a positive and significant coefficient when 
the equation is estimated in levels without specific effects (equations [1] and [4] in Table 15), but 
loses its significance when specific effects are introduced or the equation is estimated in first 
differences (equations [2], [3], [5] and [6]). In the second study, public capital remains significant 
when the equation is estimated in first differences (equation [7]), but the authors detect evidence of 
measurement error in this specification.32 Once they correct for this problem using instrumental 
variables techniques, the coefficient of public capital is again insignificant (equation [8]), although 
                                                           
32 Following Griliches and Hauman (1986) Baltagi and Pinnoi interpret changes in the coefficient of public 
capital across specifications in differences of varying length as an indication that this variable is measured with 
error. To correct this problem, in equation [8] they instrument the public capital variable using its lagged levels 
and first differences. 
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the coefficients of the private inputs are rather implausible in this specification (and in Evans and 
Karras' preferred equations). 
 
Table 16: Panel data results for the US States   
Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995a)  
________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  
 ?k 0.359 0.301 0.361 0.504 0.316 0.0746  
 [0.0112] [0.0302] [0.0233] [0.142] [0.0103] [0.027]  
 ?p 0.203 -0.0517 0.0077 -0.115 -0.0378 0.0456  
 [0.019] [0.0267] [0.0235] [0.126] [0.0103] [0.027]  
 ?l 0.497 0.691 0.659 0.643    
 [0.0144] [0.0262] [0.0225] [0.137]    
variables in: levels levels levels difs* difs** difs**  
period effects: fixed fixed fixed no trend (+) trend (+)  
regional effects: no fixed random no no fixed  
period: 1969-86 1969-86 1969-86 1969-86 1971-86 1971-86  
source: H-E (1994) H-E (1994) H-E (1994) H-E (1994) H-E&S 
(1995a) 
H-E&S 
(1995a) 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
   Notes: 
- Standard errors within brackets below each coefficient. Annual data for the 48 continental states of the US-. 
- (*) Equation [4] is estimated using data on "long differences" (difference between the values at the beginning 
and the end of the sample period), rather than in first (annual) differences. 
- A Hausman test indicates that the fixed effects model (eq. [2] is preferable to the random effects specification 
(eq. [3]). 
- (**) Equations [5] and [6] are estimated using a SUR specification, with each equation corresponding to a 
"long difference" of different length, obtained by fixing the initial year and taking longer and longer 
subperiods. 
- In equations [5] and [6] the public capital variable is "infrastructure capital", and includes streets and 
highways, sanitation and sewage, electric, gas and water utilities. The equations are also estimated using the 
entire stock of public capital with similar results. 
 
In a number of papers, Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995a, 1995b) also arrive 
at negative conclusions regarding the impact of public investment on productivity on the basis of 
an analysis of US state data. Holtz-Eakin (1994) provides additional evidence that the introduction 
of specific effects leads to the loss of significance of public capital variables. Although this author 
rejects the use of first differences, arguing that the short-term correlation between the relevant 
variables could contain too much cyclical noise to allow us to estimate a sensible production 
function, his results show that the inclusion of specific state effects is sufficient for the public capital 
stock to lose its significance, as illustrated in Table 16 (equations [1]-[4]). In his opinion, the 
existence of such effects is more than likely, and the fragility of the results to their inclusion should 
be enough to raise reasonable doubts as to the magnitude of the contribution of public investment 
to productivity growth. Holtz-Eakin and Schartz (1995a) estimate a structural convergence equation 
with panel data for the US states, using a variant of the specification proposed by Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil (1992). They find a negative coefficient for public capital (equation [5]) and a small and 
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insignificant positive coefficient in a specification with fixed state effects (equation [6]), which is 
accompanied by a rather implausible coefficient for private capital. 
Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995b) investigate the spillover effects of public 
capital across state boundaries. Holtz-Eakin (1994) reestimates some of the specifications reported 
in Table 16 with the state data aggregated into 8 regions and reports that the estimated coefficients 
do not change significantly, thus contradicting Munnell's conjecture that public capital coefficients 
should increase with the level of aggregation because estimates obtained from disaggregated data 
do not capture all the relevant external effects. (See equations [1]-[3] in Table 17). Holtz-Eakin and 
Schwartz (1995b) estimate a production function in which the effective stock of public capital of 
each state depends both on its own stock and on those of neighboring states. They assume, in 
particular, that the variable that enters directly into the (Cobb-Douglas) production function is the 
effective stock of public capital of each region (kpie), defined by33 
  (26) kpie = kpi + ? ?n win kpne  
where kpi  is the (log of) the actual stock of public capital in region i and kpne the effective stock of 
its n-th neighbor. The summation that appears in this equation is taken over all the neighbors of 
region i, win is the weight assigned to the n-th neighbor, and the parameter ? measures the rate at 
which the spillover effects of public capital decay across states. Letting kpe and kp denote the 
vectors of effective and actual public capital stocks for the different states, equation (26) can be 
written in the form 
  (27) kpe = kp + ?Wkpe  
where W is a matrix of neighbor weights. This expression can be solved for the effective capital 
stocks as a function of the observable actual stocks. 
  (28) kpe = (I - ?W)?1kp. 
Equation (28) implies that each state's effective stock of highway capital is a weighted sum of its 
own physical stock and those of all other states, with weights decreasing with distance (measured 
by the number of border crossings) and possibly other factors.  
Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz consider three alternative specifications of the weighting matrix. The 
first one ("total", with win = 1 for all n) involves using the sum of the (logs of?) the effective capital 
stocks of all neighbors. In the second one ("average"), this variable is replaced by a simple average 
of each state's neighbor's effective stocks (win = 1/Ni where Ni is the number of neighbors of state i). 
                                                           
33 The discussion suggests that the variables that appear in equation (26) should be measured in logarithms, 
but does not make it explicit. 
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In the third one, the weight of each neighbor of i is inversely proportional to its share in the total 
land area of the region formed by state i and all its neighbors. This last specification implies that the 
externalities generated by a given amount of public capital are larger if it is concentrated in a 
smaller region. 
The results for these three specifications are shown in equations [4]-[6] in Table 17. As in the 
specification without externalities, the coefficient of public capital in the production function is 
negative, and the point estimate of the externality parameter (?) is negative in two cases and 
insignificantly different from zero in the other. From these results the authors conclude that there is 
no evidence of interstate spillovers from public capital. 
 
Table 17: Spillover effects across states?   
Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995b)  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  
 ?k 0.253 0.272 0.312 0.415 0.414 0.414  
 [0.021] [0.0566] [0.044] [0.0304] [0.030] [0.030]  
 ?p 0.201 -0.120 -0.0497 -0.0222 -0.0191 -0.0206  
 [0.048] [0.042] [0.0372] [0.0249] [0.0238] [0.0301]  
 ?l 0.563 0.722 0.698 0.624 0.624 0.624  
 [0.045] [0.051] [0.0451] [0.0256] [0.0233] [0.0263]  
?    -0.148 0.0489 -0.215  
    [0.0352] [0.122] [0.152]  
variables in: levels levels levels long diffs long diffs long diffs  
period effects: fixed fixed fixed yes yes yes  
regional effects: no fixed random fixed fixed fixed  
data for 8 regions 8 regions 8 regions 48 states 48 states 48 states  
neighbours    total average wtd avge  
source: H-E (1994) H-E (1994) H-E (1994) H-E&S 
(1995b) 
H-E&S 
(1995b) 
H-E&S 
(1995b) 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
    Notes: 
- Standard errors within brackets below each coefficient. Annual data for 1969-86. 
- In equations [4]-[6] the public capital variable is the stock of roads and highways. 
 
Shioji (1999) explores the growth effects of public capital with data for the states of the US and the 
Japanese prefectures. Using panel data, he estimates a non-structural convergence equation of the 
form 
  (29) ?qit  = ?i  -  ?qit + ?pit 
where qit  is gross state product per capita in state i at time t for the US and GDP per employed 
worker for Japan, ?qit the average growth rate of this variable over the five-year subperiod starting 
at t, ?i is a state or prefecture fixed effect, and pit the log of the stock of public capital per worker at 
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the beginning of the subperiod, which is added to the equation as a determinant of the steady-state 
level of income per capita. The equation is estimated with the variables measured in deviations 
from their contemporaneous sample averages, and the stock of public capital is disaggregated into 
several components in some of the specifications. Given the chosen specification, the coefficient of 
public capital, ?, cannot be interpreted directly as the output elasticity of this factor and (since 
private investment rates are omitted from the equation), it will also capture any indirect effects of 
infrastructure that work through the induced accumulation of private factors. Shioji argues that this 
specification may be preferable to a production function or a structural convergence equation 
because, by using the initial stock of public capital as the explanatory variable, it is less likely to be 
subject to endogeneity bias and because it allows for the likely lag between infrastructure 
investment and output growth. 
Equation (29) is estimated using a variety of econometric specifications with the results 
summarized in Table 18 for the US and in Table 19 for Japan. In the first specification, which is a 
pooled regression without fixed effects (equation [1] in Tables 18 and 19), the coefficient of the 
aggregate stock of public capital is positive and significant in the US and zero in Japan. Shijoi 
argues that this result is likely to reflect an endogeneity bias induced by the omission of the fixed 
effects. Since local and state governments are largely self-financed in the US, states that are rich for 
whatever reason are likely to have larger stocks of public capital, thus accounting for the positive 
correlation uncovered by the estimation. In the case of Japan, however, the result is reversed 
because public investment is largely centralized and is the key instrument of an active regional 
policy that seeks to mitigate income disparities across prefectures. 
 
Table 18: Shioji (1999), results for the USA 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 ? 0.052 0.295 0.266 0.150 0.324 0.314 
  [0.009] [0.050] [0.043] [0.024] [0.056] [0.053] 
 P 0.536 -0.104 -0.07 0.352   
  [0.108] [0.071] [0.075] [0.122]   
 Pedu     -0.262 -0.351 
      [0.061] [0.062] 
 P infrast.     0.114 0.157 
      [0.068] [0.069] 
 estimation 
method 
pooled LSDV GMM(a) GMM(b). LSDV GMM(a) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
     Notes: 
- Standard errors in bracket below each coefficient. 
- Data for 1963-93 at five-year subintervals for the 48 continental states of the US. 
- Income variable = gross state product per capita. 
- P is the aggregate stock of public capital, Pedu. the stock of educational capital (mostly school buildings), and 
Pinfrast. the stock of infrastructures, which includes streets and highways, sewage and utilities. 
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Table 19: Shioji (1999), results for Japan 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 ? 0.055 0.104 0.063 0.076 0.126 0.109 
  [0.007] [0.013] [0.010] [0.011] [0.015] [0.014] 
 P -0.000 0.335 0.590 0.236   
  [0.069] [0.079] [0.126] [0.102]   
 Pedu     0.007 0.266 
      [0.069] [0.081] 
 P infrast.     0.176 0.241 
      [0.056] [0.062] 
 Pcons     0.019 0.034 
      [0.034] [0.038] 
 Pagric     0.127 0.227 
      [0.035] [0.039] 
 estimation 
method 
pooled LSDV GMM(a) GMM(b). LSDV GMM(a) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
     Notes: 
- Standard errors in bracket below each coefficient. 
- Data for 1955-95 at five-year subintervals for 46 Japanese prefectures. 
- Income variable = GDP per employed worker. 
- P is the aggregate stock of public capital, Pedu. the stock of educational capital (mostly school buildings), 
Pinfrast includes public housing, sewage and garbage disposal, water, city parks, roads, ports, airports and 
industrial water supply. Pcons includes investment in land conservation and Pagric. refers to agricultural and 
fisheries infrastructures. 
 
Fixed effects are introduced for both samples in equations [2]-[4] using three alternative 
econometric techniques. The simplest one (LSDV) involves the use of dummy variables to capture 
regional fixed effects, while the other two, labeled GMM(a) and GMM(b), are generalized method 
of moments techniques developed respectively by Arellano and Bond (1991) and by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and differ essentially in that the first one identifies the parameters by exploiting the 
time variation in the data, while the second one also makes use of its cross-section variation. 
Because this feature makes GMM(b) estimates more sensitive to the likely endogeneity bias 
discussed above, Shioji argues that LSDV and GMM(a) estimates are likely to be the most reliable 
ones. Under these specifications (equations [2] and [3] in both tables) the pooled regression results 
are reversed: the coefficient of the public capital variable is now positive and significant in Japan 
and negative and insignificant in the US.  
Seeking to explain this apparent puzzle, Shioji disaggregates the public capital stock into various 
components, which differ across countries reflecting data availability. His results (equations [5] and 
[6]) now suggest a positive and significant role for core infrastructures (Pinfrast) in both countries 
and for agricultural capital (Pagric) in Japan. The coefficient of educational capital (Pedu), however, 
remains quite different across countries. Shioji interprets his results as a confirmation of a positive 
link between investment in core infrastructures and productivity growth. In addition, the exercise 
serves to illustrate the sensitivity of the results to the choice of estimation technique. 
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In summary, the conclusions of the most recent panel studies with US data are markedly more 
pessimistic than those of early estimates of the impact of public investment on productivity. As we 
have seen, a number of these studies conclude that the apparent significance of infrastructure 
capital in production function estimates may be due to the use of inappropriate specifications 
which could suffer from a spurious regressions problem or which do not allow us to control 
adequately for existing cross-regional differences. It must be said, however, that some of the 
specifications selected on the basis of different statistical tests do not yield reasonable results. For 
example, the specification preferred by García-Milà, McGuire and Porter (1993) (in first differences 
with fixed state effects) implies that the rates of technical progress of some states are consistently 
higher than those of the rest and, therefore, that income differentials across states will grow without 
bound. Labor's extremely high coefficient in this regression, moreover, suggests that the estimates 
are dominated by short-run cyclical effects which can distort the long-term technical relationship 
between inputs and outputs we would like to capture. Similar problems arise also in the case of 
Evans and Karras (1994b) but not in Holtz-Eakin (1994). At any rate, the recent evidence we have 
reviewed suggests, on the whole, that the optimistic results of Munnell and Aschauer may not be 
valid and point to the need for flexible and careful econometric specifications.  
  
 5.2. Regional evidence for Spain 
Political decentralization following the transition to democracy has greatly increased the demand 
for regional data in Spain. Starting in the early 90s, a number of important studies have 
significantly increased the availability of data on key regional economic aggregates. One of the 
most relevant efforts involves the construction by a team of researchers from the Instituto 
Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) of series of stocks of private and public physical 
capital that go back to mid 60s. These data have been used in several studies of the determinants of 
productivity in the Spanish regions. Unlike their US counterparts, most of these studies yield 
positive results about the impact of infrastructure investment on output growth using econometric 
techniques that control for possible regional specificities.34 
The earliest estimates that exploit (a first version of) these data are due to Mas et al (1993a) and 
(1994). These authors estimate a production function in levels with a regional panel covering the 
period 1980-89. The public capital variable is the stock of productive infrastructure (including the 
transport network, water supply works and urban structures) estimated by IVIE (1993) and the  
                                                           
34 Some authors (see for instance García-Milà and Marimón (1995)) have expressed concern about the 
possibility that the positive correlation between public investment and output growth detected in the studies 
reviewed in this section may simply reflect short-term demand effects arising from the construction of 
infrastructures. Although it is certainly possible that demand effects may generate such a correlation, studies 
based in the estimation of production functions should not be too sensitive to this problem. Notice that 
demand effects would have to work through an increase in employment and the stock of capital in 
construction and related sectors, which are already included among the inputs that appear on the right-hand 
side of the equation. If this were the only link between infrastructure investment and output growth, the stock 
of infrastructures per se should not be correlated with productivity once we control for private inputs. 
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Table 20:  Panel data results for the Spanish regions (Mas et al) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
 ?k 0.6308 0.435 0.401 0.4191 0.4508 0.4285 0.4059 
 (11.86) (5.04) (3.73) (14.52) (12.94) (15.57) (14.13) 
 ?p    0.0697    
    (2.31)    
 ?pinf (infra.) 0.091 0.191   0.0831 0.0771  
 (3.10) (2.70)   (3.05) (2.89)  
?pinfa (incl. ady.)   0.214    0.1411 
   (2.05)    (3.48) 
 ?ps (social)     -0.0247   
     (1.04)   
?i ?i - 1    0.0586 0.0735 0.0674 0.1069 
    (1.63) (2.03) (1.88) (2.83) 
 ?l [0.28] [0.374] [0.385] [0.5698] [0.5643] [0.5618] [0.5599] 
g  0.013 0.013 0.0173 0.0174 0.0168 0.0152 
  (4.21) (3.63) (8.84) (8.98) (9.06) (7.53) 
R2 0.469 0.835 0.83 0.844 0.985 0.9845 0.9848 
variables in: levels levels levels levels levels levels levels 
regional effects: random fixed fixed fixed fixed fixed fixed 
períod: 1980-89 1980-89 1980-89 1964-91 1964-91 1964-91 1964-91 
source: (1993a) (1994) (1994) (1996) (1996) (1996) (1996) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
   Notes:   
- t statistics in parentheses below each coefficient. 
- g is the rate of technical progress. 
- In equations [1]-[3], the coefficient of labor (?l) is not estimated directly, but recovered from the assumption of 
constant returns to scale in K, P and L. 
- For columns [4]-[7], the estimated equation is of the form 
   yit = aio + gt + ?k(kit - lit) + ?p (pit - lit) + (?k + ?p + ?l - 1) lit + ?it. 
The coefficient of labor in this specification (? = ?i ?i - 1) will therefore be different from zero if the production 
function does not display constant returns to scale. The estimate of ?l shown in the table is reconstructed using the 
estimated value of  ? and the other parameters.  
 
private capital series is taken from Calabuig et al (1993). In the first paper, the preferred 
specification is the one in levels with random effects (selected on the basis of a Hausman test), while 
in the second one the authors choose a fixed effects specification (equations [1] and [2] in Table 20). 
In both cases the coefficient of public capital is positive and significant, although its size is much 
larger in the second study. To investigate the possible existence of cross-regional spillover effects, 
Mas et al (1994) also estimate an equation in which the infrastructure indicator for each region is the 
sum of its own stock of public capital and those of the neighboring regions (equation [3] in Table 
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20).35 The (slight) increase in the size of the estimated coefficient is interpreted, rather 
optimistically, as evidence of the existence of such effects.36 
In a later piece (Mas et al, 1996), the same authors reexamine the problem using longer series. The 
output and employment data are now taken from Fundación BBV (1995) and refer to private sector 
output, excluding the energy sector.37 Mas et al estimate different variants of a fixed effects model 
disaggregating the public capital stock in various alternative ways. In equation [4] in Table 12, the 
regressor is the total stock of public capital, including accumulated investment in educational and 
health infrastructures ("social capital"). In equation [5], this variable is disaggregated into two 
components: an indicator of productive infrastructure, similar to the one used in previous studies 
by the same authors, and a measure of the stock of social capital. The coefficient of the first of these 
variables (?pinf) is around 0.08, while that of the second one (?ps) is not significantly different from 
zero (it should be kept in mind, however, that the output measure used in this study does not 
include public services). After excluding this second component of the stock of infrastructure in 
equation [6], the estimation is repeated in equation [7] using as a regressor the sum of the 
infrastructure stocks of each region and all the adjacent ones. The increase in the relevant coefficient 
(?pinfa), which is considerably more significant than in the previously cited study, is interpreted by 
the authors as an indication of the existence of cross-regional spillovers. Finally, Mas et al also find 
evidence of a gradual decrease in the elasticity of output with respect to the stock of infrastructure. 
To capture a possible saturation effect, the authors reestimate their production function with 
different subsamples of increasing length. The first estimation, which corresponds to the period 
1964-73, yields a coefficient of public capital of 0.14, which falls to 0.077 when the entire sample 
period is used. 
Serra and García-Fontes (SGF, 1994) construct estimates of the regional stocks of public capital 
using the data reported by Frutos (1991), the Regional Accounts of the National Statistical Institute 
and other sources, and estimate a production function both in levels and in first differences. Their 
results, although not as positive as those of Mas et al (possibly due to the lower quality of their 
data), display a rather different pattern than the US studies reviewed above. As can be seen in Table 
21, the size of the coefficient of public capital is rather modest in the Spanish case when the 
estimation is in levels (equations [1]-[3]) but increases (instead of becoming negative) in a 
                                                           
35 Álvarez et al (2006) question the logic of Mas et al's "pseudo-test" for cross-regional externalities and fail to 
find evidence of the existence of such effects using more standard specifications. Other studies, however, 
report the opposite finding (see the references in Alvarez et al, 2006).  
36 The change in the public capital coefficient is somewhat larger when the authors impose constant returns to 
scale in the private factors (K and L) rather than constant returns in all factors (neither of these restrictions is 
rejected by the data). In this case, public capital's coefficient increases from 0.243 (when the regressor is each 
region's own public capital stock) to 0.306 when the stock of neighboring regions is added to the domestic one. 
The change in the value of the coefficient, however, is smaller than the standard error of the estimate.  
37 The authors, however, do not discuss the construction of this aggregate which cannot, in principle, be 
reconstructed for the entire sample period using their sources. 
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specification in first differences (equations [4]-[6]), although it also loses significance. On the other 
hand, the inclusion of specific effects in the equation in levels tends to improve the results in the 
Spanish case, and to worsen them with the US data.  
 
Table 21:  Panel data results for the Spanish regions  
(SGF, 1994) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 ?k 0.63 0.57 0.49 0.19 0.21 0.34 
 (19.73) (17.34) (10.88) (1.88) (2.15) (2.99) 
 ?p 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.27 0.38 0.25 
 (1.74) (0.75) (2.53) (1.53) (1.93) (1.23) 
 ?l 0.35 0.41 0.46 0.21 0.15 0.14 
 (7.68) (10.36) (8.21) (2.95) (2.06) (1.95) 
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.14 0.47 0.49 
variables in: levels levels levels difs. difs. difs. 
period effects: no fixed fixed no fixed fixed 
regional effects: no no fixed* no no fixed* 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
- (*) Note:  Given the shortness of the sample period, the authors have chosen to use a set of suprarregional 
dummies (rather than a dummy for each region) to distinguish between three groups of regions according to 
their average income levels during the sample period. 
 
González-Páramo and Argimón (G-P&A, 1997) estimate a fixed effects model with data from the 
same sources as Mas et al (1996), disaggregating the public capital stock into a productive and a 
social component. Their results, summarized in columns [1]-[3] ot Table 21, are qualitatively similar 
to those of the previous study, although there are some changes in the results that may arise from 
differences in the data or in the specification. The finding that social capital now enters the equation 
with a positive and significant coefficient may be due to the fact that G-P&A work with total 
regional value added, without excluding the output of the public sector. On the other hand, the 
specification used by these authors does not seem to include either a trend or period fixed effects. 
This may explain why the estimated coefficients of capital and labor appear to be less plausible than 
those reported by Mas et al (1996). G-P&A also estimate a random effects model (equation [3]) 
including the regional land area (sup) among the regressors as a possible determinant of transport 
costs, together with the infrastructure stock. As expected, the estimated coefficient of this variable is 
negative and significant. 
Dabán and Lamo (D&L, 1999) estimate various random effects specifications in levels using 
instrumental variables techniques to correct for possible endogeneity problems. Their output and 
capital stocks series are taken from the BDMORES database of the Ministry of Finance and cover 
the period 1980-93 at an annual frequency. The dependent variable is the output of the productive 
private sector, excluding both non-market services and residential rentals (both real and imputed). 
Among the explanatory variables, they include the stock of infrastructures, a human capital 
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indicator (the number of workers with some university schooling) and three variables that may 
affect transport costs for a given stock of infrastructures: regional land area (sup), the standard 
deviation of altitude within the region (alt), and the dispersion of population (pd), measured by the 
number of population centers. Their specification controls for capacity utilization (cu) at the 
national level and for the regional rate of unemployment (u) to capture possible cyclical shocks. 
 
Table 22:  Panel results for the Spanish regions (various authors) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 ?k 0.69 0.62 0.65 0.251 0.388 0.265 
 (22.68) (16.13) (17.41) (3.70) (3.78) (2.65) 
 ?p 0.19      
 (8.52)      
 ?pinf (infra.)  0.09 0.09 0.108 0.099 0.030 
  (3.89) (3.62) (4.42) (2.90) (1.00) 
 ?ps (social)  0.13 0.13    
  (5.28) (5.29) 0.249 0.016 -0.084 
?h    (4.99) (0.29) (2.80) 
       
?i ?i - 1    0.145 0.137  
    (10.47) (8.18)  
 ?l [0.12] [0.16] [0.23] [0.537] [0.634] [0.789] 
R2 0.978 0.978 0.975 0.726 0.516  
variables in: levels levels levels levels q-difs*  
regional effects: fixed fixed random random random fixed 
period effects: no no no no no fixed 
period: 1964-91 1964-91 1964-91 1980-93 1980-93 1969-91 
other variables:   sup (-) sup(-), pd (-), 
alt (+), U(-), 
cu(?) 
sup(-), pd (-), 
alt (+), U(-), 
cu(?) 
initial 
income per 
capita  (-) 
source: G-P&A G-P&A G-P&A D&L D&L Gorost. 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
    Notes: 
- The coefficient ?l shown in the Table is recovered using the assumptions made by each author about returns to 
scale and the relevant parameter estimates. 
- G-P&A impose constant returns in all inputs (including land area in equation [3]). The coefficient of labor shown 
here is given by ?l = 1 - ?i?l ?i. The infrastructure stock used in equations [2] and [3] includes private toll highways. 
- D&L. They employ GMM techniques, using as instruments the lagged values of the regressors and the public 
capital stocks of neighboring regions. The equation does not include a trend because this term is not found to be 
significantly different from zero in a preliminary estimate. The authors do not report the estimated coefficient of 
capacity utilization. As in Mas et al (1995), the coefficient ?i ?i - 1 captures the degree of returns to scale. See the 
notes to Table 6. 
(*) Equation [5] is estimated in quasi-differences, using a Cochrane-Orcutt type procedure to correct for an 
autocorrelation problem detected in the residuals of equation [4]. 
- Gorostiaga instruments ln (spit/(?+g+nit)) with ln (?+g+nit-1) where ? = 0.05 is the assumed depreciation rate, g = 
0.02 the rate of technical progress and n the growth rate of the working-age population. 
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The results, summarized in columns [4] and [5] of Table 22, coincide in general terms with those of 
previous studies, at least in terms of the infrastructure coefficient, which lies around 0.10. Unlike 
other authors, however, Dabán and Lamo find evidence of increasing returns to scale and control 
for a human capital indicator as well as for orography and the pattern of population settlement. The 
educational variable seems to have a very large effect on productivity in the first specification 
(equation [4]), but loses its significance when a correction for autocorrelation is introduced in 
equation [5]. As for the second group of variables, both land area and the dispersion of the 
population are significant and enter the equation with the expected sign, but the orography variable 
displays a counterintuitive sign (other things equal, regions with more uneven terrain seem to be 
more productive). 
Gorostiaga (1999) obtains rather more pessimistic results than the previous studies through the 
estimation of a convergence equation à la Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) derived from an 
extended Solow model that includes human capital and infrastructures as well as physical capital 
as inputs in the production function. This author estimates a fixed effects specification similar to the 
one proposed by Islam (1995) using panel data techniques and instrumenting the rate of public 
investment. She finds a negative coefficient for the stock of human capital and an elasticity of 
output with respect to the stock of infrastructures that is not significantly different from zero 
(equation [6] in Table 22). Although some aspects of the estimation are rather problematic,38 the 
study is useful as a warning that, also in the Spanish case, the available results on the relationship 
between infrastructures and productivity are quite sensitive to the choice of specification. 
Delgado and Alvarez (2000) construct a synthetic infrastructure indicator using a principal 
components technique to combine various measures of infrastructure endowments in physical 
units. Their series cover the period 1985-95 and are constructed using information on transport 
networks and facilities (kilometers of roads, highways and railways and measures of the capacity of 
ports and airports), telecommunications (number of telephone lines) and energy supply networks 
(kilometers of oil and gas pipelines and electricity supply lines). These variables are normalized by 
the land area of the region or by its population (ports and airports). The infrastructure indicator is 
used to estimate a regional production function where the stock of physical capital is measured, as 
usual, in monetary units. The authors estimate a fixed effects model and a model in first differences, 
using at times IV techniques with lagged regressors as instruments. One problem with their 
                                                           
38 In particular, the choice of proxy for the rate of investment in human capital and the instrument chosen for 
the rate of public investment are questionable. The first of these variables includes only direct public 
expenditure on education and, unlike most of the studies on the subject, does not make use of available 
information on enrollment or achievement rates. The chosen variable, moreover, is available only after 1980, 
forcing the author to extrapolate it backward over the rest of the sample period. As for the second issue, 
Gorostiaga essentially uses the lagged rate of population growth as an instrument for the public investment 
rate. This variable is unlikely to be a good instrument because public investment in Spain has been driven by 
redistributive concerns over much of the sample period and there is no clear correlation across regions 
between income levels and population growth rates. 
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specification is that it does not seem to allow for technical progress: there is no trend in levels, no 
constant in differences and no fixed period effects.  
Table 23 summarizes the main results. The coefficient of the infrastructures variable is positive, 
significant and quite large in the specification in levels but becomes considerably smaller and 
becomes only weakly significant when the model is estimated in first differences. On the other 
hand, infrastructures maintain their significance in both levels and first differences when 
instrumental variables are used to deal with potential endogeneity and measurement error 
problems. 
 
Table 23: Delgado and Álvarez (2000) 
_____________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
?k 0.29 0.36 0.22 0.19 
 (6.48) (7.84) (2.83) (3.65) 
?p 0.20 0.10 0.25 0.25 
 (4.47) (1.63) (3.15) (3.50) 
?l 0.40 0.46 0.47 0.47 
 (6.96) (5.72) (6.33) (4.85) 
data in levels diffs. levels diffs. 
reg effects fixed  fixed  
estimation OLS OLS IV IV 
period 1985-95 1985-95 1985-95 1985-95 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Álvarez et al (2003) estimate a regional production function using two alternative infrastructure 
series: Delgado and Alvarez's (2000) data set based on physical indicators, and a new version of the 
IVIE series of net capital stocks measured in monetary units (FBBVA, 1998). Table 24 summarizes 
some of the main results. Equations [1]-[3] are estimated with the FBBVA data and equations [4]-[6] 
use Delgado and Alvarez's data on physical infrastructure indicators. Constant returns to scale in 
all three inputs are imposed in equations [3] and [6] but not in the rest. All equations include 
regional fixed effects.  
The results are, on the whole, positive. The coefficient of infrastructures is positive, significant and 
large in all equations but one. The exception is equation [2] where fixed period effects are 
introduced to control for technical progress and constant returns to scale are not imposed. The 
authors indicate that there is a high correlation (over 0.90) between the stocks of infrastructures and 
private capital on one hand and time on the other, and that this makes it difficult to untangle their 
effects without additional restrictions. Imposing constant returns does help, in the sense that it 
helps recover what seem to be more sensible results, but the authors also note that the data seem to 
reject this restriction. 
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Table 24: Álvarez et al (2003) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
?k 0.49 0.11 0.26 0.59 0.11 0.21 
 (11,3) (2.5) (5.0) (13.5) (2.9) (4.1) 
?p 0.22 0.01 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.21 
 (8.3) (0.2) (4.3) (4.7) (3.1) (7.7) 
?l 0.29 0.43 [0.63] 0.26 0.40 [0.58] 
 (10.6) (7.0)  (5.2) (7.3)  
period effects: no yes yes no yes yes 
CRTS no no yes no no yes 
period: 1980-95 1980-95 1980-95 1980-95 1980-95 1980-95 
infr. data: FBBVA FBBVA FBBVA D&A D&A D&A 
______________________________________________________________________ 
- Note: all equations include regional fixed effects. D&A = Delgado and Álvarez (2000). 
 
De la Fuente (2002) and de la Fuente and Doménech (D&D, 2006b) estimate a model that combines 
a Cobb-Douglas regional production function in differences (taken over two-year periods) with a 
technical progress function that allows for technological catch-up across regions using two 
consecutive versions of the IVIE data set (Fundación BBV (1998) and Mas et al (2002)). The 
specification includes regional fixed effects and either period fixed effects or a trend and trend 
squared. The results are shown in Table 25. As in most previous studies, the infrastructures variable 
is significant and displays a positive coefficient. The size of this coefficient, however, is significantly 
smaller than in some of the previous studies reported above, particularly in the case of D&D 
(2006b)—a result that implies more plausible rates of return to infrastructure than those of other 
studies discussed in this section. 
 
Table 25: de la Fuente (2002) and de la Fuente and Doménech (2006b) 
_______________________________________ 
 [1] [2] 
?k 0.297 0.171 
 (5.73) (3.27) 
?p 0.106 0.0567 
 (2.14) (3.25) 
?l [0.597] [0.772] 
   
?h 0.286 0.835 
 (7.30) (2.04) 
vars in diffs diffs 
period effects: no yes 
reg. fixed effects yes yes 
other vars tech gap, t, 
t2 
tech gap 
period 1964-93 1965-95 
source D 2002 D&D 2006 
_______________________________________ 
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 5.3. Regional evidence for other countries 
Table 26 summarizes the results of a series of studies that have estimated Cobb-Douglas production 
functions using regional data for Greece and Italy. Bonaglia, La Ferrara and Marcellino (BFM, 2000) 
and Picci (2000) both use the series of regional private and public capital stocks constructed by 
Bonaglia and Picci (2000). The results I report are those obtained with a broad measure of public 
capital (including educational, administrative and health facilities as well as core productive 
infrastructures) which appears to be similar to the one used in R&S (2002) for Greece. By contrast, 
Bronzini and Piselli (B&P, 2009) rely on the series of stocks of public capital constructed by 
Montanaro (2003), using as a regressor a measure of the stock of core infrastructures that includes 
roads and water and electricity supply networks. Most papers use standard OLS specifications in 
levels with fixed regional effects or in first differences. The exception is Bronzini and Piselli (2009), 
who estimate the model in levels using panel cointegration techniques. These authors, in particular, 
use the fully-modified OLS estimator developed by Pedroni (2000), which corrects for endogeneity 
of the regressors and for serial correlation of the error terms.  
 
Table 26: Regional results for Greece and Italy 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
?k 0.088 0.166 0.140 0.171 0.072 [0.35] 0.427 0.146 
 (2.00) (2.26) [0.021] (17.2) (2.77)  [0.031] [0.019] 
?p 0.202 0.451 0.005 0.358 0.184 0.109 0.192 0.190 
 (2.53) (2.46) [0.029] (16.3) (2.69) [0.004] [0.007] [0.011] 
?l 0.811 0.531 [0.855] 0.836 0.462 [0.65] [0.573] 0.557 
 (16.39) (6.21)  (15.7) (8.12)   [0.033] 
vars in levels diffs levels levels diffs levels levels levels 
period 
effects: 
trend  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
reg. effects fixed fixed fixed fixed no fixed fixed fixed 
other vars  CU  CU    R&D(+), 
HC(+) 
R&D(+), 
HC(+) 
R&D(+), 
HC(+) 
period 1982-92 1982-92 1970-94 1970-95 1970-95 1985-01 1985-01 1985-01 
country Greece Greece Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy 
Source: R&S  R&S  BFM Picci Picci B&P  B&P  B&P  
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Notes: 
- Source: R&S = Rovolis and Spence (2002); Picci = Picci (2000); B&P = Bronzini and Piselli (2009); BFM = 
Bonaglia, La Ferrara and Marcellino (2000). 
- Other variables: HC = human capital, measured by average years of schooling. R&D = stock of R&D capital. 
- B&P: Equations [6] and [7] assume constant returns to scale in private capital and labor. In equation [6], TFP 
is computed using the coefficients shown in the Table for these two factors (which reflect observed factor 
shares) and this variable is used as the dependent variable. In equation [7] the regressor is average labor 
productivity and the coefficient of labor that is shown in the table is recovered using the constant returns 
assumption. In equation [8] the dependent variable is total output and no assumption is imposed regarding 
returns to scale. 
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Generally speaking, the results are similar to those obtained with Spanish data. The coefficient of 
public capital is positive, significant and relatively large in most cases, even though all 
specifications control for regional effects. The one exception is BFM (equation [3]), where the 
coefficient of public capital is not significantly different from zero. The discrepancy between this 
paper and Picci's equation [4] is rather surprising given that both studies seem to use very similar 
data and a common econometric specification. At any rate, BFM (2000) also report that public 
capital has a large and significant positive coefficient in the center and south macro regions when 
the estimation is repeated independently for different subsamples, and that the same is true for the 
sample as a whole for the core component of productive infrastructures.  
 
 6. Conclusion 
The relationship between infrastructures and productivity has been the subject of a debate that is 
still ongoing in the literature. The available empirical evidence is inconclusive and its interpretation 
is complicated by econometric problems that have not been fully solved. Early work on the subject, 
notably by Aschauer (1989a and b) and Munell (1990b), concluded that the elasticity of national or 
regional output with respect to public capital is large and very significant, and that the rate of 
return on public investment is exceedingly high. A number of more recent studies, however, have 
questioned these results on the basis of various econometric problems. Some of these studies find 
that the significance of public capital disappears when a specification in first differences is used or 
fixed effects are introduced to control for unobserved national or regional specificities, and 
conclude that the accumulation of public capital does not appreciably contribute to productivity 
growth. Other recent papers, by contrast, confirm the significance of infrastructure indicators using 
cointegration or panel data techniques and, in many cases, point to rates or return that are much 
more modest than those estimated in early work, but also much more credible.  
Table 27 summarizes most of the evidence I have reviewed in Sections 4 and 5 of this paper. For 
each of four samples (comprised, respectively, by the states of the US, the regions of Spain, various 
groups of countries and regions of different nations) and three broad groups of specifications 
(convergence equations and production functions estimated with the data in levels, with and 
without specific (fixed or random) effects, and production functions estimated with the data in 
differences) the table shows the total number of equations reported in the text tables in previous 
sections of the paper and the fraction of this total in which the estimated coefficient of the relevant 
public capital or infrastructures variable is positive and significant (+), negative and significant (-) 
and insignificantly different from zero (0), using a t value of 1.8 as the cut-off point for 
significance.39 The one exception has to do with the reporting of several papers by Canning and 
                                                           
39 In the case of Easterly and Rebelo, I consider only those equations where the public investment variable is 
one of the following: total public investment, general government investment, and investment in transport and 
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coauthors where different physical infrastructure indicators are added to an equation where the 
total stock of physical capital (including infrastructures) is one of the regressors. As the authors 
point out, the coefficients of the infrastructure variables in this specification will tell us whether or 
not infrastructures are more or less productive than the rest of the stock of capital, not whether it 
does make a positive contribution to productivity. Hence, I include these results in the (+) group 
whenever the infrastructure coefficients are either significantly positive or not significantly 
different from zero (as the total stock of capital always has a positive and significant coefficient). 
 
Table 27: Summary of reported results 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. Data in levels without specific effects 
  no. of eqs.  (+) (0)  (-) avge ?p avge. t 
 US states 10 100% 0% 0% 0.204 9.43 
 Spanish regions 3 0% 100% 0% 0.03 1.16 
 cross country 29 45% 45% 10%  1.11 
 regions of other ctries.       
2. Data in levels with specific effects 
  no. of eqs.  (+) (0)  (-) avge ?p avge. t 
 US states 16 31% 56% 13% 0.004 0.51 
 Spanish regions 21 95% 5% 0% 0.129 3.99 
 cross country 4 50% 25% 25%  0.25 
 regions of other ctries. 11 91% 9% 0% 0.176 9.19 
3. Data in differences 
  no. of eqs.  (+) (0)  (-) avge ?p avge. t 
 US states 15 7% 87% 7% -0.030 -0.58 
 Spanish regions 8 63% 38% 0% 0.190 2.17 
 cross country 8 75% 25% 0% 0.121 0.79 
 regions of other ctries. 2 100% 0% 0% 0.318 2.58 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Whenever possible, I have also added the average coefficient of infrastructures or public capital (?p) 
and the average t ratio for each group of estimates. Average coefficient values should be interpreted 
with care because different studies use different infrastructure or public capital aggregates. It 
should also be kept in mind that the two averages reported in the table are generally computed 
over different sets of regressions. Average t ratios are calculated taking into account the signs of 
these statistics (ie. those of the coefficient estimates) and make use of most of the estimates given in 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
communications. In each case, I take into account both the basic equation and the extended one that includes 
additional regressors. 
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the relevant tables. The exceptions (i.e. the observations that are used to calculate the % of 
significant estimates but not the average t ratio) are two sets of estimates that produce t ratios that 
cannot be directly compared with those of most specifications: the Canning et al results mentioned 
above, and a few equations where the stocks of infrastructures of neighboring regions are added 
together with the region's own stock to construct a single infrastructure regressor that mixes 
spillovers and direct, own-region effects. Finally, there are some equations where infrastructure 
stocks are disaggregated into several components. In this case, I have taken the largest coefficient 
and t ratio associated with a core infrastructure variable (typically roads), ignoring health or 
education variables. 
The average value of ?p has been calculated using only those equations that produce estimates of 
this production function parameter using data on either the total stock of public capital, some broad 
infrastructure aggregate or a core infrastructure indicator. Hence, I have excluded (in addition to 
the observations not used to calculate average t's) most convergence equations and some equations 
where infrastructures are disaggregated into components or include the stock of neighboring 
regions. When I do not report average t or average ?p it is because over half of the total 
observations in the relevant group of estimates are unsuitable to calculate these averages for the 
reasons I have just discussed. 
As can be seen in Table 27, the cross-country evidence is inconclusive, but also very hard to assess 
due to differences across studies in sample composition and econometric specification and to the 
likely lack of homogeneity of the cross-country fiscal data. Regional studies should be free of most 
of these problems, but they also display a mixed pattern of results that at best allows the drawing of 
rather tentative conclusions. Early positive results with regional samples by Munell and other 
authors are probably unreliable because they fail to control for specific effects that are quite likely to 
be there and can generate substantial biases. The elimination of specific effects through differencing 
often leads to the loss of significance of public capital variables. As I have already noted, however, 
such specifications can be questioned on the grounds that first-differenced data may contain too 
much short-term noise to allow for the estimation of a production function. The fact that estimates 
of the coefficients of private inputs obtained with these data are typically quite unreasonable seems 
to point in this direction, notwithstanding the results of formal tests that are invoked in some 
studies to select differenced specifications.  
This leaves us with estimations in levels with specific regional effects as the most likely source of 
reliable results. Focusing on those studies that have followed this approach, the one thing that 
stands out in Table 27 is the difference in results across the two main regional samples we have 
considered. Public capital variables are almost always significant in panel data specifications for the 
Spanish regions, and often insignificant in similar exercises conducted with US data. As Fernald 
(1999) notes, however, the existing data for the US states starts in 1970, i.e. at approximately the 
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time when the interstate highway system was completed. This author conjectures that this fact may 
explain the negative results of most US studies. The evidence from Spain and other Mediterranean 
countries is consistent with this hypothesis, as the per capita stock of infrastructure are much 
smaller in these countries than in the US, and so are the findings by Mas et al (1996) and Fernald 
(1999) that the coefficient of infrastructure tends to fall as the sample period is extended.  
On the whole, my reading of the evidence is that there are sufficient indications that public 
infrastructure investment contributes significantly to productivity growth, at least for countries 
where a saturation point has not been reached. The returns to such investment are probably quite 
high in early stages, when infrastructures are scarce and basic networks have not been completed, 
but fall sharply thereafter. Hence, appropriate infrastructure provision is probably a key input for 
development policy, even if it does not hold the key to rapid productivity growth in advanced 
countries where transportation and communications needs are already adequately served.  
On the other hand, the great disparity of results we find in the literature is worrisome, to say the 
least, and points to the need for further work in this area. It seems reasonable to interpret some of 
the results I have reported as an indication of the persistence of various data and econometric 
problems, as well as of the possible need for a more flexible framework than the one generally used 
in the literature. First of all, there is in all likelihood an important data problem that may bias 
estimates of infrastructure coefficients toward zero. Many of the public capital series used in the 
studies we have reviewed (particularly at the cross-country level) are rather tentative estimates 
constructed starting from incomplete primary sources and covering relatively short periods. 
Secondly, it is quite likely that we have not yet fully solved other relevant econometric problems, 
starting with the possible endogeneity of the regressors. A third factor to consider is that the 
monetary cost of a given infrastructure may not be a good measure of the productive services it 
supplies. The usual specifications of the production function assume implicitly that a dollar spent in 
roads has the same impact in all regions (holding the stocks of other inputs constant). It seems clear 
that this is not the case, as both construction costs and the productive impact of different types of 
infrastructures may differ across regions reflecting factors for which most studies do not control, 
such as orography and climate. As we have seen, there are also some indications in the literature 
that controlling for this factors and using physical infrastructure indicators helps improve the 
results somewhat. 
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